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NOTE
STUDENT EXPRESSION ON CAMPUS AND INTERFERENCE
WITH THE "RIGHTS OF OTHERS"
INTRODUCTION

October 15, 1969 was a date historically distinguished by the
first Vietnam Moratorium. On this occasion college students and
others around the nation observed a suspension of normal activities as a means of emphasizing their opposition to the American
role in the Vietnam War. Many students chose to manifest their
dissent in symbolic fashion by wearing black armbands to school,
and their right to do so ultimately became the subject of litigation
in several localities. Given the applicable case law relating to
administrative restriction of student protest, the response of the
courts was predictable in its vindication of this form of expression
wherever there was reason to anticipate it would have minimal
disruptive potential.'
On the campus of the University of Wyoming a different kind
of conviction gave rise to a contemporaneous protest which likewise was expressed symbolically and resulted in legal action.2 In
this instance, however, the object of the protest was the racial
policy of the Mormon Church, which prohibits black members
from becoming church officers or rising to the priesthood.' Viewing this as a deliberate relegation to second-class status, black
students at Wyoming initiated a plan to publicize their opposi'Compare Butts v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971) (wearing
of armbands on Moratorium Day protected) with Hill v. Lewis, 323 F. Supp. 55 (E.D.N.C.
1971) (wearing of armbands on Moratorium Day prohibited because of large enrollment
of students from military families and resultant potential for violence).
2
Williams v. Eaton, 310 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Wyo. 1970), vacated in part, 443 F.2d 422
(10th Cir. 1971), 333 F. Supp. 107 (D. Wyo. 1971), afl'd, 468 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1972).
'Note, Wearing of Black Armbands by State University Football Players Would Violate Establishment of Religion Clause, 19 KAN. L. REV. 316, 321 (1969), citing CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF THE LATTER DAY SAINTS, DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS § 116 (1960). As summarized here by a quotation from the New York Times, blacks are "figuratively relegated
to the back pew." N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1965, at 15, col. 1.
This is apparently the only other published comment on the legal issues arising out
of the Wyoming armband protest. Although three other decisions were rendered in
Williams subsequent to the publication of the article, it remains a useful source for the
researcher, particularly on the jurisdictional and procedural issues of the case. See
.generally Comment, The Authority of a College Coach: A Legal Analysis, 49 ORE. L. REv.
442 (1970).
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tion in conjunction with an upcoming football game to be played
on October 18, 1969 with Brigham Young University, a school
owned and operated by the Mormon Church.
In anticipation of this occasion, the Black Student Alliance
at Wyoming drafted a letter to William D. Carlson, President of
the University, and Lloyd Eaton, head football coach, articulating its objection to the scheduling of athletic contests with
Brigham Young, and calling for others to offer symbolic support
to this position by "a black arm band worn throughout any contest involving BYU." 4 This letter was subsequently published by
the school newspaper and the campus community was thereby
made aware of the planned protest.
On Friday, October 17, a group of 14 black football players
met with Coach Eaton to discuss their intention to wear armbands during the game the next day. Since they were already
wearing armbands, however, Eaton dismissed them from the
team for violation of a coaching rule which prohibited participation by Wyoming football players in any protest or demonstration. 5 An emergency meeting of the Board of Trustees of the uni'Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 3, 4, Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir.
1972).
5
According to Coach Eaton, campus protest "was getting to be quite a popular thing,"
and so he imposed this coaching rule to "be prepared for it" and "keep our young men
out of it," since "they are here to get an education .... " Id. at 49. In essence, Eaton
"told them that it was not 'Cowboy football' to protest or demonstrate, meaning that they
should not deviate from the main group." Id. at 6.
In that this coaching rule purported to restrict important first amendment rights and
applied to players even when they were off the field, it would appear clearly invalid as a
prior restraint, especially since no criteria were set up to determine its applicability in a
given case and no procedural safeguards were established for review of the coach's decision.
At the trial, Eaton sought to explain the rule by reference to the need for unity on a
football team. Id. at 50. In this instance, however, administrative regulation in the interest
of "unity" would seem to be merely a prescription for the abridgment of student athletes'
freedom of speech. See Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 59-60 (4th Cir. 1971); Vail v.
Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592, 597-98 (D.N.H. 1973): "The regulation assailed by the
plaintiffs is a blanket prohibition . . . .It does not reflect any reasonable, constitutional
standards of the First Amendment as applied to the orderly administration of high school
activities."; Dunn v. Tyler Indep. School Dist., 327 F. Supp. 528, 533 (E.D. Tex. 1971):
"The regulation in issue here fails . . . [the required precision of regulation], since it
arbitrarily prohibits all boycotts, sit-ins, stand-ins, and walk-outs without limiting its
proscription to such activities involving misconduct or those which present a material and
substantial disruption of the educational environment."; Hammond v. South Carolina
State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967); Aldrich, Freedom of Expression in Secondary Schools, 19 CLEV. STATE L. REv. 165, 169 n.20 (1970); Nahmod, Black Arm Bands and
Underground Newspapers: Freedom of Speech in the Public Schools, 51 CHI. B. REc. 144,
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versity was then convened for that evening, and this body upheld
the dismissal of the players after a complete review of the facts.
As the basis for their action, the board members reasoned that
the players were irrevocably committed to wearing their armbands during the game, and that the constitutional mandate of
separation of church and state prohibited university accession to
this action.6
The athletes then filed a civil rights suit7 in the United States
District Court for the District of Wyoming, naming various officials of the university as defendants and praying for a temporary
restraining order to have themselves reinstated to the team. In
addition, they sought damages, permanent injunctive relief, and
a declaratory judgment to the effect that the actions of the defedants had abridged their constitutional right of free expression.
Upon an evidentiary hearing, the temporary restraining order was
denied, and the court subsequently granted defendants' motion
to dismiss as to the other claims.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the judgment of the district court with respect to the
dismissal of claims against the State of Wyoming and the claims
for money damages against the named State officers. The judgment was vacated, however, with respect to the dismissal of
claims against State officers for equitable and declaratory relief,
and further proceedings were ordered.' On remand, the district
court held that "[t]he rights of the Plaintiffs to freedom of
speech . . . cannot be held paramount to the rights of others to
practice their religion free from state-supported protest ... " and
again dismissed the complaint. 9
148 (1969); Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DE~vER L.J. 582, 593 n.24
(1968): "[Clolleges should be most clear and confined and provide for the least general
administrative discretion with respect to rules applied to first amendment interests ....
Vague, overly broad, or standardless rules in this area are regarded as unconstitutional
per se due to their chilling effect on these preferred freedoms."; Developments in the
Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1131 (1968): Hammond "made it clear
that a rule requiring prior administration approval of all campus demonstrations was an
unconstitutional restraint on student first amendment rights; a fortiori, a fiat ban on all
campus demonstrations would be impermissible." (emphasis added).
'Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 14, 15, Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir.
1972).
'Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
'Williams v. Eaton, 310 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Wyo. 1970).
'Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1971).
"Williams v. Eaton, 333 F. Supp. 107, 115 (D. Wyo. 1971) (emphasis added). The
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Upon a renewed appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the trial
court on two disputed factual interpretations." It then observed
that "stemming from state and federal law there is strong support
for a policy restricting hostile expressions against religious beliefs
of others by representatives of a state or its agencies.""2 For this
reason, the, court continued, it would be unnecessary to decide
"whether approval of the armband display would have involved
state action or a violation of the religion clauses," since the university's decision was a "reasonable regulation of expression" in
the interest of "protect[ing] against invasion of the rights of
others by avoiding a hostile expression to them by some members
of the University team."' 3 In accordance with this holding, the
decision of the trial court was affirmed.
I. THE STANDARD FOR STUDENT EXPRESSION
As authority for its emphasis on protecting the "rights of
others" in Williams, the Tenth Circuit relied on Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District.4 Since Tinker
serves as the landmark decision on student expression, the rule
established there was clearly controlling as to the legal issues
presented in Williams. In order fully to understand that rule,
however, it is necessary first to discuss two Fifth Circuit cases,
court also found that under the bylaws of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, it
was no longer possible to reinstate the plaintiffs to the team, since by this time (2 years
after the .incident) they had all either exhausted their eligibility or left the university. It
should be noted, however, that "[wihen controversies present what are essentially recurring issues of public interest they are not mooted because the most recent particular
occasion for consideration of the issue has come and gone." Women Strike for Peace v.
Hickel, 420 F.2d 597, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
"The facts in dispute were: (1) the contention by plaintiffs that one of the reasons
for wearing the armbands was to protest alleged name-calling and "cheap shots" in the
previous year's game with Brigham Young, and (2) the plaintiffs' disagreement with
testimony by various school officials that the athletes had refused to play again for the
University of Wyoming so long as Eaton remained football coach. Williams v. Eaton, 468
F.2d 1079, 1081-83 (10th Cir. 1972).
"Id. at 1083.
"Id. at 1084 (emphasis added).
14393 U.S. 503 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Tinker v. Des Moines]. The Tinker protest
was initiated in December, 1965 by three children (ages 13-15), who testified that their
"purpose in wearing the arm bands was to mourn those who had died in the Viet Nam
war and to support Senator Robert F. Kennedy's proposal that the truce proposed for
Christmas Day, 1965 be extended indefinitely." Their plans had become known to school
officials in advance, and a regulation was adopted "prohibiting the wearing of armbands
on school premises." 258 F. Supp. 971, 972 (S.D. Iowa 1966). When the students chose to
wear the bands despite the regulation, they were suspended and "did not return to school
until after the planned period for wearing armbands had expired ....
" 393 U.S. at 504.
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Burnside v. Byars'5 and Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of
6 on which Tinker
Education,"
was primarily based.
In Burnside, the Fifth Circuit had considered the right of
black students at a segregated Mississippi high school to wear
"freedom buttons" on school property "as a means of silently
communicating an idea and to encourage the members of their
community to exercise their civil rights [of registration and voting].""7 The school administration had responded by enacting a
regulation which prohibited the wearing of political buttons by
students, because such insignia "didn't have any bearing on their
education" and might create a commotion. 8 The court, however,
reasoned that "[tihe right to communicate a matter of vital
public concern is embraced in the First Amendment right to freedom of speech and therefore is clearly protected against infringement by state officials,"'" except where "the exercise of such
rights in the school buildings and schoolrooms . . . materially
and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." 2 And since here
"the presence of 'freedom buttons' did not hamper the school in
carrying on its regular schedule of activities,"2 the disciplinary
regulation was enjoined.
Although decided by the same court on the same day and
based on a factual situation comparable to that in Burnside,
Blackwell reached a different conclusion. There, several months
after the Burnside protest, black students at a neighboring high
school again wore "freedom buttons." This time, however, the
students "conducted themselves in a disorderly manner, disrupted classroom procedure, interfered with the proper decorum
and discipline of the school and disturbed other students who did
not wish to participate in the wearing of the buttons." 2 Concluding that, "as distinguished from the facts in Burnside," there had
been "an unusual degree of commotion, boisterous conduct,
[and] a collision with the rights of others," the court held that
'5363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
"1363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
'1363 F.2d at 747 (footnote omitted).
1Id. at 746-47. Note the similarity of this reasoning to that of Coach Eaton in Brief
for Defendants-Appellees, supra note 5.
I1363 F.2d at 747.
1"Id. at 749.
"Id. at 748.
12363 F.2d at 753.
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here a material and substantial interference with the work of the
school had resulted.2 The decision of school officials to suspend
participating students
in the interest of restoring order was there4
2

fore sustained.

When the armband protest in Tinker came under consideration, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Iowa made explicit reference to the standard evolved in
Burnside and Blackwell. It observed, however, that "it is the view
of [this] Court that actions of school officials .

should not be

limited to those instances where there is a material or substantial
interference with school discipline," thus rejecting the Fifth Circuit standard. Instead the court decided to apply a simple test of
reasonablenessl under which it upheld the authority of school
27
officials to prohibit the wearing of armbands on campus.
The Eighth Circuit was equally divided on the case, and it
therefore affirmed without issuing an opinion as to the appropriate test to be applied.2 8 Upon appeal, however, the Supreme
Court chose to sanction the analysis developed by the Fifth Circuit. Characterizing the communication of student opinion as a
"direct, primary First Amendment right,"" the Court concluded
that the wearing of an armband for this purpose was constitutionally protected as expression "closely akin to 'pure speech.' ,0
Consequently, it was held that this form of expression could not
be restricted by school officials "in the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons. . . . ,,3 But, the Court cautioned, "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for
any reason . . . materially disrupts classwork [or school activities] or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights' of32
others is, of course, not immunized by. . . freedom of speech.
1Id. at 754. It is important to note that the interference the court found in this case
was based entirely on physical, rather than symbolic, conduct.
2'd.

"5 Tinker v. Des Moines, 258 F. Supp. 971, 973 (S.D. Iowa 1966) (emphasis added).
1d. This is not unlike the approach taken in Williams. 468 F.2d at 1084.
"258 F. Supp. at 973.
"Tinker v. Des Moines, 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967).
"393 U.S. at 508.
"JId. at 505.
1Id. at 511.
"Id. at 513 (emphasis added), citing Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363
F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). Note the concurrence of Mr. Justice White to the effect that "the
Court continues to recognize a distinction between communicating by words and communicating by acts or conduct.
... Id. at 515.
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Having thereby adopted the Fifth Circuit standard for student expression, the Court applied it to the facts in Tinker and
held that school officials could not under the circumstances have
"forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities" or the rights of others. 33 Accordingly, the decision of the district court, and implicitly its reliance on the reasonableness test, was overturned.
II. "RIGHTS OF OTHERS" EXCEPTION
The "rights of others" exception to Tinker has received very
little judicial explication since first enunciated in 1969. Though
"not a model of clarity or preciseness, '3 the available authority
seems to have construed it so as to refer to physical interference
with the "substantially educational functions ' 35 of the school and
the safety and educational rights of other students. 3 In short,
"Id. at 514.
3
Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 808 (2d Cir. 1971).
15The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 H~Av. L. REv. 62, 161 (1969).
3
Tinker warned against interference with "the rights of other students to be secure
and to be let alone." 393 U.S. at 508. This somewhat vague statement apparently derived
from the Blackwell fact pattern, where a symbolic protest degenerated into violent disorder, physical coercion, and substantial disruption of school activities. In deciding
Blackwell, the Fifth Circuit had made specific reference to West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), where "the Court was careful to note that the
refusal of the students to participate in the [flag salute] ceremony did not interfere with
or deny rights of others to do so.
... 363 F.2d at 754. In direct contrast, the court
concluded, the Blackwell students had evidenced "disregard for the orderly progression
of classroom instruction, and their complete disregard for the rights of their fellow students." Id. at 753.
Other cases which have interpreted the "rights of others" exception have discussed
it in terms of a student's right to pursue his education unimpeded by those protesting.
When the above quotation from Tinker was written, therefore, it seems probable that the
court had the educational rights and the safety of others primarily in mind. See, e.g.,
Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969) (discusses
student interference with the rights of others in a case involving "[d]estruction to property, threats to others, frightening passersby, and intrusions upon their rights of travel"),
citing Barker v. Hardway, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969)
(students suspended for "[d]estructive interference with the rights of others") (emphasis
added); Evans v. State Bd. of Agric., 325 F. Supp. 1353 (D. Colo. 1971) (relied on the
"rights of others" exception in a situation presenting substantial potential for physical
disruption and interference with the safety of others); Los Angeles Teachers Union v. Los
Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 71 Cal. 2d 551, 455 P.2d 827, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969): "[lit
is imperative that the courts carefully differentiate in treatment those [students and
teachers] who are violent and heedless of the rights of others as they assert their cause
and those whose concerns are no less burning but who seek to express themselves through
peaceful, orderly means." 455 P.2d at 836, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
See also Denno, Mary Beth Tinker Takes the Constitutionto School, 38 FORDHAM L.
Rv. 35, 47 (1969) (discusses the necessity of finding "physical interference" with school
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judicial attention has focused on preventing interference with the
"educational process,"3 7 taking care that, despite the naturally
distractive nature of some student expression, nonparticipating
students will not be obstructed in the normal pursuit of their
3
academic or extracurricular activities. 1
A.

"Rights"
The underlying rationale of Tinker is that the constitutional
rights of students are generally coextensive with those of adults,
except where there exists a "sufficient educationallyoriented reason," arising from "circumstances attributable to the school environment," which "make[s] necessary more restrictive measures
than generally permissible under the First Amendment . . . .
For example, a student's right to free speech on campus stops
short of the point where he interferes with school work or disrupts
normal school activities." "This is [the] substantive evil . . .
school officials have a right to prevent."' The authority school
functions); Leahy, "Flamboyant Protest," The First Amendment and the Boston Tea
Party, 36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 185, 203 (1970) (limits authority of school officials to prevention of "disorder on the campus and substantial interference with school work"); The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 35, at 160-61: "School authorities must be allowed
to protect the primary educational function of teaching in the classroom and the secondary
functions of school administration which necessitate maintenance of at least minimal
order outside the classroom. Schools must also insure the physical safety of their students." For a discussion of the application of the "rights of others" exception in Williams,
see note 57 infra.
"Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 472 F.2d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 1973);
Sword v. Fox, 446 F.2d 1091, 1096-98 (4th Cir. 1971); Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist.,
392 F.2d 697, 703 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1968); Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149, 152 (D.
Neb. 1973); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1336 (D. Mass. 1970).
"8 See, e.g., Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969);
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1966).
39
Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1336-37 (D. Mass. 1970) (emphasis
added). See Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); Comment, Freedom of
Expression in Student Demonstrations, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 168, 174 (1969).
'"Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 397 U.S. 31, 33-34 (1970), withdrawing cert. as improvidently granted to 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Murray v. West
Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 472 F.2d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 1973): "Although a student
does not discard his First Amendment rights upon entering the school house door, . . .
the First Amendment does not give individual students the right to disrupt openly the
educational process in order to press their grievances."; Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School
Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir. 1968); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363
F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966); Wright, The Constitutionon the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027,
1041-43 (1969): "It seems to me... that a university is not obliged to tolerate interference
with 'any lawful mission, process, or function of the institution,' or, in a simpler phrase,
that 'the normal activities of the University' are protected." For pre-Tinker cases to the
same effect, see Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 588 n.11.
"Leahy, supra note 36, at 203 (emphasis added). See Scoville v. Board of Educ., 286
F. Supp. 988, 991 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
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officials have over the exercise of constitutional rights by students
is limited, therefore, to insuring the normal functioning of the
educational process.4"
Under Tinker, then, a student does not forfeit his freedom of
speech at the arbitrary discretion of a school official, or simply
because his expression is school-related in that it arises on campus. 4 3 If the exercise of a constitutional right does not substantially interfere with school activities, a student is generally free
to express his opinions just as if off-campus." And the burden of
establishing that disruptive interference is on the regulating authority (school officials). 4"
But where simple expression of opinion is transformed into
action constituting a substantial physical interference with normal activities or with the lives of others, school authorities may
take reasonable steps to restore order.46 Even silent or symbolic
protest may be restrained if substantially likely to generate
conduct which might reasonably result in violence." In the ab"Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1340 (S.D. Tex. 1969):
"The schools . . . should be able to control those activities which relate to or affect
education."; Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate
Student Conduct and Status: A NonconstitutionalAnalysis, 117 U. PA. L. Rv.373, 387
(1969): "[A] school board has that power, and only that power, over student conduct and
status which is properly related to its function of educating the pupils in its charge."
"Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1966):
"[S]chool officials should be careful in their monitoring of student expression in circumstances in which such expression does not substantially interfere with the operation of the
school."
"Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543, 546 (N.D. Ga. 1972): "Although University
administrators once had an almost unrestricted power to deal with students under the
theory of in loco parentis, it is now clear that constitutional restraints on authority apply
on campuses of state supported institutions with fully as much sanction as public streets
and in public parks."; American Civil Liberties Union v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp.
893, 896 (W.D. Va. 1970); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1336-37 (D. Mass.
1970) (noted there was no specific showing that the harm from controversial speech was
greater on campus than on other public property, therefore no justification was shown for
a stricter standard on campus); Wright, supra note 40, at 1042.
"Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969); Vail v. Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp.
592, 597 (D.N.H. 1973); Hanover v. Northrup, 325 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D. Conn. 1970);
Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D. Mass. 1970); Nahmod, supra note 5,
at 148; The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 35, at 158; Comment, Right of Free
Speech, 11 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 275, 277 (1969).
"Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1971); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of
Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
"Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1972) (Confederate flag patch worn in
integrated school with tense racial situation); Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir.
1970); Hill v. Lewis, 323 F. Supp. 55 (E.D.N.C. 1971); Hernandez v. School Dist., 315 F.
Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1970). But see Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969), where
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sence of this kind of potential for disruption, however, the content
of the protest alone cannot afford justification for restraining
speech. 8 In effect, then, any intereference with the "rights of
Mr. Justice Fortas commented that "some [students] even wore the Iron Cross, traditionally a symbol of Nazism." Though certainly mistaken as to its symbolism, Fortas' words
indicate he thought of the Iron Cross as antisemitic and potentially provocative, yet he
apparently did not consider it an invasion of the rights of other (Jewish) students.
Note also that the impermissible conduct must arise with the demonstrators themselves, rather than with the audience:
Even if the record showed . . . some threat of violence by hostile spectators,
it would not constitute a proper basis for restraining [the demonstrators']
otherwise legal first amendment activity.
National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1014 n.4 (4th Cir. 1973),
citing Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951);
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746, 75455 (7th Cir. 1972); Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 1965);
Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 109 (M.D. Ala. 1965). See also Watson v. Memphis,
373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963): "[Clonstitutional rights may not be denied simply because of
hostility to their assertion or exercise."; Pickings v. Bruce, 430 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir.
1970): "Such statements may well increase the tensions within the College and between
the College and the community, but this fact cannot serve to restrict freedom of expression."; Comment, supra note 39, at 173: "In order to punish demonstrators the school
must further show that the disruption was made by the demonstrators themselves rather
than by others reacting to the protected expression. Justice Fortas emphasized the importance of this distinction [in Tinker] in his reference to [Burnside and Blackwell]."
"See, e.g., National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1017
(4th Cir. 1973). In dealing here with the right of a political group to assemble in a public
school auditorium for the purpose of communicating racist and anti-semitic views, the
court quoted Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961)
(Black, J., dissenting), to this effect:
I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms of speech,
press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be
accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the
ideas we cherish.
For further general comment on this point, see Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Police
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21, 24 (1971);
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Jones v. State Bd. of Educ.,
397 U.S. 31, 33 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting): "The leaflet now censored may be illtempered and in bad taste. But we recognized in Terminiello v. Chicago . . . that even
strongly abusive utterances or publications not merely polished and urbane pronouncements of dignified people, enjoy First Amendment protection."; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring): "One's beliefs have long been thought to
be sanctuaries which government could not invade."; Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,
592 (1969): "[A]ny shock effect of appellant's speech must be attributed to the content
of the ideas expressed. It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to
some of their hearers."; Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965): Persons may not "be punished merely for peacefully
expressing unpopular views."; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964);
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 632-34 (1943): "Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicat-
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others" must generally arise from the mode or vehicle of communication, rather than the message sought to be communicated."
Thus the Tinker guideline for student expression is really an
adaptation to the school environment of the traditional standard
for free speech, maintaining the essential distinction between
ing ideas." (emphasis added); Goguen v. Smith, 471 F.2d 88, 98, 103 (1st Cir. 1972):
Government may not "subject individuals to punishment for feelings and words-clearly
... ; Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623,
protected First Amendment activities.
633-34 (2d Cir. 1972); Shanley v. Northeast School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970, 971 (5th Cir.
1972); Kalemba v. Turk, 353 F. Supp. 1101, 1103 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Channing Club v.
Board of Regents, 317 F. Supp. 688, 691 (N.D. Tex. 1970): "That the language is annoying
or inconvenient is not the test. Agreement with the content or manner of expression is
irrelevant; first amendment freedoms are not confined to views that are conventional, or
thoughts indorsed [sic] by the majority."; Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329,
1337 (D. Mass. 1970): A "restriction . . . reasonably related to the educational process"
is permissible. "But to tell a student what thoughts he may communicate is another
matter."; Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 23 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Wright,
supra note 40, at 1043, 1051-52.
Banks v. Muncie Community Schools, 433 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1970) provides a good
illustration of the general irrelevance of content with specific regard to symbols. There the
court rejected plaintiffs' argument that Tinker "precludes a school from compelling minority pupils 'to endure [offensive] official symbols at a tax supported institution which
they are compelled to attend.' " Id. at 298. As noted by expert testimony, this school's
"official symbols [Confederate flag, "rebels," etc.] represented a system that enslaved
[black students'] ancestors." Id. at 297. Yet the court held that, despite their offensive
nature, "the adoption of symbols by the majority of the students is merely the exercise of
their first amendment right of free speech and the state has not insinuated itself into
private acts of discrimination." Id. at 298 (emphasis added).
Of course, this general rule is subject to traditional exceptions-defamation, obscenity, and "fighting words"-where expression can be restricted on the basis of content:
The First Amendment protects the communication of ideas, not all communication. Incitement to illegal action, libel, obscenity, and "fighting words,"
while communicative, do not express ideas and do not merit First Amendment protection.
Deeds v. State, 474 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). Clearly the Williams protest
was intended to express "ideas" within the ambit of constitutional protection.
"See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971): Governmental interference
with a person's expression "can be justified, if at all, only as a valid regulation of the
manner in which he exercised that freedom, not as a permissible prohibition on the
substantive message it conveys."; Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273, 1380
(D.C. Cir. 1972): "It has always been thought that citizens have an absolute right to speak
when their mode of communication in no way interferes with the rights of others." (emphasis added); Shanley v. Northeast School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 971 n.8 (5th Cir. 1972):
"The more active the methodology of expression, the more inherent its potential interference."; Kalemba v. Turk, 353 F. Supp. 1101, 1104 (N.D. Ohio 1973): "The even more
surprising aspect of the case is that the greatest harm which could be shown to result from
the wearing of the armbands at issue was that . . . [some] would experience emotional
displeasure" in viewing the demonstrators. "Moreover, the displeasure shown is one which
was not related to the wearing of armbands themselves but to the unpopular ideas symbolized by the armbands."
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"a de facto

T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 115 (1966): "The
whole theory rests upon the general proposition that expression should be free and unrestrained, that the state may not seek to achieve other social objectives through control of
expression, and that the attainment of such objectives can and must be secured through
regulation of action." See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445 (1969) (Douglas, J.,
concurring): It is the difference between "free speech" and "free speech plus." Expression
"can be regulated only on the 'plus' or 'action' side of the protest."; Tinker v. Des Moines,
393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (White, J., concurring); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th
Cir. 1966): "[Tlhe mere presence of ... political symbols is not calculated to cause
disturbance sufficient to warrant their exclusion from school premises unless there is some
student misconduct involved." (emphasis added); Denno, supra note 36, at 55: "All kinds
of speech, argument and persuasion are disturbing, possibly causing great anger among
school boards and officials who see their smooth operations ruffled by mere students using
the school to express themselves. But, absent open interruption within classrooms . . .
until students 'pass the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertake incitement to
riot' or similar overt action, they are protected." (emphasis added); Wright, supra note
40, at 1043: "Expression cannot be prohibited because of disagreement with or dislike for
its contents . . . .Expression can be prohibited if it takes the form of action that materially and substantially interferes with the normal activities of the institution or invades
the rights of others." (emphasis added).
On this same point, consider the absence of any discussion in Williams on the distinction between regulating expression and regulating conduct. Aside from Tinker, Williams
cited only one other student speech case, Sword v. Fox, 446 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1971),
apparently for the proposition that a university need only meet a standard of
reasonablenessin governing demonstrations on its campus. Yet Sword specifically related
the test of reasonableness to preserving order on campus, preventing interference with
school activities, and maintaining normal administrative operations. The "rights of others" exception was not mentioned, and the decision even emphasized that the contested
policy on demonstrations in school buildings (presumably sit-ins), unlike the regulation
in Williams, did "not purport to pass on the purpose of the demonstrations" (i.e., the
message sought to be communicated) in determining its claim to protection. Sword v. Fox,
supra at 1097 (emphasis added). (In this respect, note that the regulation overturned in
Tinker also "was directed against 'the principle of the demonstration' itself," since
"[slchool authorities simply felt that 'the schools are no place for demonstrations'
393 .U.S. at 509 n.3).
In effect, then, the Williams court failed to acknowledge that the content of student
dissent cannot be regulated by a standard of mere reasonableness. (See the discussion in
note 53 infra on "clear and present danger.") A reasonableness test can be applied only
with respect to conduct accompanying the dissent or substantially likely to be incited by
the views to be expressed. (See the cases cited in note 47 supra.) This distinction has been
summarized as follows:
The extent to which expression may be restricted varies somewhat, depending on whether the limitation sought is to be placed on the expression
itself (meaning content) or on conduct which is incidental to the expression
(meaning time, place, manner and duration).
The standard devised for direct regulation of expression . . .provides
that the exercise of the expression sought to be limited must interfere to a
substantial and material degree with [normal school activities or the rights
of others].
The standard devised for regulation of conduct [and] which inciden-
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physical interference with the function of the schools ....
Thus, as characterized by one commentator:

$,51

The Supreme Court, in Tinker, continues the application of
basic principles laid down in Dennis v. United States and Cantwel
v. Connecticut where it is apparent that for speech, symbolic or
verbal, to be the proper subject of state abridgment, there must not
only be some "substantial state interest" at stake, but such speech
(or conduct amounting to speech) must inevitably lead to acts adverse to the state interest sought to be protected ....
A "silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied
by any disorder or disturbance" will not be enough to justify prohibition ."2

Tinker may therefore be viewed as merely "a school-related version of the . . .'clear and present danger' rule," where speech
with an inevitable tendency to produce action constituting immitally limits speech ... provides that reasonable restrictions ... are recognized ....
Channing Club v. Board of Regents, 317 F. Supp. 688, 691 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (emphasis

added) (cites Tinker, Blackwell, and Burnside). Channing went on to comment that the
restriction there prohibiting distribution of a student-published newspaper on campus was
constitutionally invalid as "a direct limitation by the State on the content of the expression, rather than an incidental restriction of time, place and manner of distribution." Id.
Wyoming school officials likewise framed their decision in terms of the hostile content of
the Williams protest. In upholding their action, the Tenth Circuit repeated this emphasis
on the "hostile expression" symbolized by the armbands, and chose to "sustain the Trustees' decision . . .as a reasonableregulation of expression under the limited circumstances involved .... " 468 F.2d at 1083-84 (emphasis added). Unlike Sword, therefore, the
Williams court did rely on the purpose of the expression, yet phrased its opinion as if it
were merely following Sword in regulating the time and place for the expression.
In summary, Tinker established that wearing an armband as a symbol of one's opinion is "closely akin to 'pure speech.' " 393 U.S. at 505. It is therefore subject to restriction
only under the constitutional standard for regulating "pure speech." This standard recognizes the need for the state, under a test of reasonableness, to serve an "impartial traffic
function" in minimizing the interference of the expression with normal school activities.
Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The High School as an EducationalPublic Forum, 5 HARv. CIV.
RPGHTS-CIv. Lis. L. REV. 278, 294 (1970). Mere reasonableness, however, cannot be used
as the standard for evaluating the purpose or content of the expression. For that end, the
views expressed must be shown to "interfere in a 'material and substantial' way with the
administration of school activity . . . or with the rights of other students." Vail v. Board
of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592, 598 (D.N.H. 1973) (emphasis added). For the most recent
comment on this point by the Supreme Court, see Papish v. University of Mo. Curators,
410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973): "The mere dissemination of ideas-no matter how offensive to
good taste-on a state university campus may not be shut off in the name alone of
'conventions of decency.' " Here the "petitioner was dismissed because of the disapproved
content of the newspaper rather than the time, place, or manner of its distribution."
I'Denno, supra note 36, at 47 (emphasis added).
sComment, supra note 45, at 276-77 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted), quoting
Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
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nent danger of" 'material and substantial disruption' of the operation of the school" is the evil sought to be avoided.5
It would seem to follow, then, that the University of Wyoming may restrict silent protest of the type in Williams only
where the expression will give rise to that kind of action school
officials have authority to prevent. Yet the Williams panel specifically stated, "[w]e do not base our holding on the presence of
any violence or disruption. There was no showing or finding to
that effect . . . ."5 Instead the court pointed to the need for
protecting "against invasion of the rights of others by avoiding a
hostile expression to them . . . ."I The question necessarily
arises, then, whether others have a right to avoid "hostile expression," including the expression of opinion on their religious beliefs. 5"
Interestingly, Williams cited no case of any kind where silent, symbolic expression, in the absence of violence or disruptive
potential, has been held to violate the rights of others." Indeed,
$Abbott, The Student Press: Some Second Thoughts, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 989, 992-93
(1970). An earlier article by the same author defined the "clear and present danger" rule
as follows:
As originally stated, the test was "whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The
Supreme Court subsequently restated the test as follows: "In each case,
[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
Abbott, The Student Press: Some First Impressions, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 19-20 n.72
(1970). For more recent comment on the test, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969).
See also National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir.
1973); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); Scoville v. Board of
Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 13 (7th Cir. 1970); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363
F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1966) (cited with approval in Tinker); Sullivan v. Houston Indep.
School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149, 1159 n.ll (S.D. Tex. 1971); Channing Club v. Board of
Regents, 317 F. Supp. 688, 691 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges,
306 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Hammond v. South Carolina State College,
272 F. Supp. 947, 950 (D.S.C. 1967) (cited with approval in Tinker); Divine, A Note on
Tinker, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 539 (1971); Leahy, supra note 36, at 203; Wright, supra
note 40, at 1042; Comment, supra note 39, at 173.
"Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1079, 1084 (10th Cir. 1972) (emphasis added).
,,Id.
"As previously stated, the burden is clearly on the state to provide authority for its
position that an armband protest under the conditions in Williams would have violated
the rights of those exposed to the demonstration. (See cases cited note 45 supra.)
"1And a complete review of cases which have subsequently cited Tinker has revealed
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none. Ironically, another case originating in Wyoming, Jergeson v. Board of Trustees, 476
P.2d 481 (Wyo. 1970), is one of the few to have interpreted the "rights of others" exception
in somewhat similar fashion to the approach taken in Williams. There an article written
for a high school newspaper by a class of journalism students expressed opinions critical
of disciplinary measures taken by certain teachers. Rather than evaluating these student
opinions on the basis of their effect on the educational functions of the school, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that they "collide[d] with the rights of others, namely the
teachers" involved. Id. at 485.
In Tinker, however, it was held that school officials "must be able to show that
[their] action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular [or hostile] viewpoint." 393
U.S. at 509. Moreover, the general interpretation of the Tinker standard runs strongly
counter to the Jergeson analysis. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972);
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968): The "suggest[ion] that teachers
[or students] may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment
rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in
connection with the operation of the public schools in which they work . . . has been
unequivocally rejected ....
" (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, Shelton v. Tucker, and
Keyishian v. Board of Regents); Duke v. North Texas State Univ., 469 F.2d 829, 837 (5th
Cir. 1972); Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970 n.10 (5th Cir.
1972); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 14 (7th Cir. 1970): The "editorial . . .
reflects a disrespectful and tasteless attitude toward authority. Yet does that imputation
....
without more, justify a 'forecast' of substantial disruption or material interference
with the school policies or invade the rights of others? We think not. The reference
undoubtedly offended and displeased the dean. But mere 'expressions of [the students']
feelings with which [school officials] do not wish to contend' is not the showing required
by the Tinker test to justify expulsion."; Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1391
(N.D. Ind. 1970); Aguirre v. Tahoka Indep. School Dist., 311 F. Supp. 664, 666 (N.D. Tex.
1970) (wearing brown armbands in support of those who advocate certain changes in
educational policies and practices held not "disruptive of normal educational functions");
Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969): "This lawsuit arises at a time
when many in the educational community oppose the tactics of the young in securing a
political voice. It would be both incongruous and dangerous for this court to hold that
students who wish to express their views on matters intimately related to them.., may
be precluded from doing so by that same adult community."; Dickey v. Alabama State
Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (expulsion of student editor for criticizing
state officials overturned) (cited with approval in Tinker); Hammond v. South Carolina
State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967) (cited with approval in Tinker); Nahmod,
supra note 50, at 287: A "disrespect" test might chill legitimate expression. "An accusation that a principal has 'racist views and attitudes' . . . might also serve . . . a useful,
though controversial, function in the high school. This suggests that a distinction in terms
of educational function between personal attacks against school personnel and other protest against personnel [e.g., against state officials, as in Dickey, supra] is not tenable for
first amendment purposes."; Wright, supra note 40, at 1057: "[Sipeech cannot be punishable on campus simply because it is vigorous or uncomplimentary. . . . [T]he first
amendment did not enact Mrs. Emily Post's book of etiquette."; Developments in the
Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 5, at 1130: "[R]esponsible student criticism of
university officials is socially valuable, since in many instances the students are peculiarly
expert in campus issues and possess a unique perspective on matters of school policy."
Consider also Evans v. State Bd. of Agric., 325 F. Supp. 1353 (D. Colo. 1971), which
likewise involved a proposed protest (following a previous violent protest) by black students at Colorado State University during an athletic contest with Brigham Young. In
upholding a prohibition on all demonstrations at scheduled athletic events, the court
relied on the "rights of others" exception, not in the Williams sense of religious disparage-
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Tinker itself stands for the freedom "to expose others to one's
opinion." 58 In Williams, the opinion expressed was essentially
ideological and secular in both origin and purpose, and touched
on religion only incidentally. 5 As such, it constituted a manifestly political statement aimed at the implications and social
consequences of Mormon racial policy. Consequently, it did not
interfere with the "rights" of anyone, since there is no right of
immunity from the political views of a minority, even though
peripherally related to religious belief.6 As noted above, when
ment, but to emphasize the potential for physical disruption of school activities and the
need for protecting the safety of others. Id. at 1360. See Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp.
228 (S.D. W. Va. 1968) (student protest at football game for correction of grievances "far
exceeded the bounds of a peaceful demonstration" and could therefore be restricted, but
"sing-in" on college president's lawn, though conducted after midnight and intended to
harass and annoy, held not punishable because it remained peaceful).
The net effect of this review is that there is scant authority, if any, for the unusual
interpretation in Williams of the "rights of others" exception. As expressed in Burnside,
"the presence of . . . [political symbols] did not hamper the school in carrying on its
regular schedule of activities; nor would it seem likely that the simple wearing of buttons
[or armbands] unaccompanied by improper conduct would ever do so." 363 F.2d at 748.
To repeat the warning in Blackwell, there is a "fundamental requirement that school
officials should be careful in their monitoring of student expression in circumstances in
which such expression does not substantially interfere with the operation of the school."
363 F.2d at 754. (See the textual discussion of Panarellav. Birenbaum accompanying
notes 99-117 infra, and refer again to the distinction between regulating content and
conduct, note 48 supra.)
5
"Nahmod, supra note 50, at 292 n.58. As observed by another authority: "The Tinker
Court thought that the first amendment protects a learning process in state schools which
is open, vigorous, disputatious, disturbing-a robust dialetic in which error is combatted
with reason, not fiat." The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 35, at 159.
59
1n other words, the purpose of the demonstration was to protest racial discrimination, rather than to engage in religious bigotry. (Refer to textual discussion accompanying
notes 87-93 infra.) See Todd v. Rochester, 41 Mich. App. 320, 200 N.W.2d 90 (1972), where
a novel (Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse Five) used in a public school curriculum made
only incidental or ancillary reference to religious matters for essentially literary reasons,
and therefore did not constitute establishment of religion.
Consider also the comment of Mr. Justice Goldberg in School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp to the effect that "many of our legal, political and personal values
derive historically from religious teachings." 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (concurring opinion).
If one accepts the practical truth of this statement, the general relegation of blacks to
second-class status in American society can be viewed as deriving in some small measure
from the racial policy of the Mormon Church, at least in areas like Wyoming where
Mormon influence is strongly felt. When viewed from this perspective, it is easier to
comprehend both the origin and intensity of the black athletes' feelings on this issue and
the reason why a religous group was chosen as the object of the protest.
"See the textual discussion of religious criticism by private individuals accompanying
notes 81-95 infra. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969); The Supreme Court,
1968 Term, supra note 35, at 156: "Because the student's message was political, their
conduct was peculiarly deserving of protection against the unwarranted interference of
public officials."
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school authorities are dealing with noneducational interests, only
those which could also be legally protected off-campus should be
held to have that substantial and material gravity needed to invoke the protection of the "rights of others" exception.
This is especially true where, as in Williams, there was a
valid and logically connected reason for protesting (at the B.Y.U.
game) and the vehicle (armband) of communication chosen was
relatively unobtrusive and unprovocative.6 ' From the viewpoint of
those who proposed to conduct the protest, it was adequately
provoked, calculated to draw mass attention to a legitimately felt
grievance, and served a "useful, though controversial, function." In short, it was an attempt "to express their views on
matters intimately related to them, through traditionally accepted nondisruptive modes of communication .
*"3
B.

"Others"
In Tinker and its foundational predecessors, Burnside and
Blackwell, the audience affected consisted almost exclusively of
school children, and the concern of the courts in each case was
directed toward their educational and physical well-being. In effect, Tinker can be viewed as having established a "variable free
speech" standard for expression on campus." For that reason the
proper application of the Tinker rule in any given situation is
necessarily related to the age level of the particular audience
exposed to the expression.
Professor Charles Alan Wright addressed this point in a recent article, where he noted:
I find no ...

reason to believe that the rules applicable to high

"Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969): The Tinker armband protest involved "a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of petitioners."; Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332, 1337 (6th Cir. 1972)
(Miller, J., dissenting): "The nature of the 'symbolism' . . . is of significance ..
";
Butts v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 436 F.2d 728, 731 (5th Cir. 1971): "The boy who came
to school flaunting his Nazi symbols was also, of course, communicating his ideas in his
own fashion. However, the black armbands were more adult, more rational adornments.";
Watson v. Thompson, 321 F. Supp. 394, 397 (E.D. Tex. 1971): "[T]he wearing of 'freedom
buttons' is not significantly different from the wearing of a black armband. Hence, it is
also closely akin to pure speech; and thus neither is, in and of itself, conceivably classifiable as conduct."; Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
"2Nahmod, supra note 50, at 287.
"3Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The essence of freedom of
speech is the right to express views on issues which directly affect oneself.
"Cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635 & n.4, 638-40 (1968), where the concept
of "variable obscenity" was adopted by the Supreme Court.
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schools can be indiscriminately transferred to institutions of higher
learning. . . .The average university student is more than 21 years
old and is surely an adult. The average high school student is in his
mid-teens, and we have been authoritatively taught that even in the
area of free expression important consequences can be made to
"depend upon whether the citizen is an adult or a minor."'

Another authority has emphasized that the'permissible scope of
student first amendment activity is dependent not upon the age
of the person claiming the right to free speech, but upon the age
of those being protected from the expression." Thus, the older the
students in the audience, the weaker the state interest in protecting them from questionable speech. 7
In summary, there is compelling authority for the proposition
that, as in Ginsberg v. New York, 6" the more mature the audience,
the greater should be the tolerance for controversial expression.
The audience being protected in Williams (presumably the football crowd) consisted of a general cross section of the public
rather than school children alone, and taken as a whole its collective sensibility must be held more resilient than these of the
"Wright, supra note 40, at 1052-53 (footnotes omitted), quoting Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968). For the statistical information on student age, Wright
relied on Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 988 (W.D. Wis. 1968), citing U.S. BURzAu
OF THE CENSUS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20,
No. 110, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 12 (1961). See James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d
566, 574 (2d Cir. 1972): An important basis of distinction here was that the students were
"more mature than those junior high school students in Tinker."; Scoville v. Board of
Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 13 n.5 (7th Cir. 1970); Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238, 242
(E.D.N.Y. 1969): The rights of high school students are more restricted than those of
college students because "the former [are] in a much more adolescent and immature
stage of life and less able to screen fact from propaganda."; Abbott, supra note 53, at 993;
Nahmod, supra note 5, at 147-48: "[E]lementary school students are much more easily
distracted and less able to fend for themselves intellectually than high school students.";
The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 35, at 160 n.34: "The state's special interest
in the education of children justifies stricter regulation of conduct in public schools than
in an adult education class . . .[since] children are more easily distracted."
"The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 35, at 157. See also Vail v. Board of
Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592, 598 (D.N.H. 1973) (court may consider "the age or maturity of
those to whom [expression] is addressed").
"7See Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361 (1st Cir. 1969): "Hence the question in
this case is whether a teacher may, for demonstrated educational purposes, quote a 'dirty'
word currently used in order to give special offense, or whether the shock is too great for
high school seniors to stand. If the answer were that the students must be protected from
such exposure, we would fear for their future."; Webb v. Lake Mills Community School
Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 799 (N.D. Iowa 1972): "The state interest in limiting the discretion
of teachers grows stronger . . . as the age of the students decreases ..
";The Supreme
Court, 1968 Term, supra note 35, at 157: "(T]he Court has recognized a greater state
interest in protecting the young from harm than in protecting adults .
"390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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children affected in Tinker. 9 To overlook this distinction is to
misinterpret the precedential value of the "rights of others" exception.
C.

Tinker Variables
Enough has been said to suggest the potential for abuse inherent to the uncritical application of the Tinker rule, without regard
to the circumstances or the age of those affected. What is needed,
then, is an evenhanded analytical approach to Tinker, one which
isolates the underlying reasons for establishing a flexible standard for campus expression, and then determines their applicability in each individual case.
The Tinker situation involved a number of variables which
might be viewed as the circumstantial background for the rule
enunciated there. For example, the protest occurred (1) on school
grounds, (2) during normal school hours, and (3) carried over into
the classroom itself where it exposed (4) an audience of high
school students to whatever (5) distractive or disruptive force it
possessed. In effect, these variables encompass those things
which lend themselves to disruption of the normal work of the
school. For this reason, they serve as guidelines for the proper
application of the Tinker standard.
An analysis of Williams with these factors in mind reveals
that the protest there was scheduled to occur during the weekend
when intereference with normal academic activities would be
impossible. In addition, it was to take place in a nonacademic
setting, outside the classroom and open to the general public,
where there was less reason to fear any potential disruptive effect.70 Finally, it was to be entirely passive, and those who were
"As for the potential argument that the protest was forced upon a "captive audience,"
see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971): "[Mluch has been made of the claim
that Cohen's distasteful mode of expression was thrust upon unwilling or unsuspecting
viewers, and that the State might therefore legitimately act as it did in order to protect
the sensitive from otherwise unavoidable exposure to appellant's crude form of protest
... .Yet this Court has consistently stressed that 'we are often "captives" outside the
sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech.' "; Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576, 592 (1969): "Again, such a conviction could not be sustained on the ground that
appellant's words were likely to shock passers-by. . . .[Any shock effect of appellant's
speech must be attributed to the content of the ideas expressed. It is firmly settled that
under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely
because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers." Cf. Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361-62 (1st Cir. 1969); Kalemba v. Turk, 353 F. Supp. 1101, 1104 (N.D.
Ohio71973).
Cf. Nahmod, supra note 5, at 147: "It may be argued . . .that standards for free
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to be exposed to it were primarily adults. It would seem, then,
that the Williams protest would have involved none of the factors
critical to restriction of speech under the Tinker standard, other
than the fact that it was to have taken place on school property.',
Since the primary reasons for regulating expression on school
property do not obtain during after-class hours, 2 it is difficult to
understand why the Williams court chose to accept such a restric3
tive application of the Tinker rule .
In effect, Williams may have interposed the rationale of
Tinker without carefully examining the limitations and complexities that determine its applicability. Clearly, Tinker represents
a step beyond in loco parentis, 4 but it nevertheless stands for the
authority of school officials to restrict expression by students in
given situations. In order to guard against abuse of this restrictive
authority, it is essential that the criteria for its exercise be precisely defined. Tinker sets up a standard that allows for these
procedural safeguards. Under this standard "the first amendment applies with full vigor on the campus," 5 but it cannot be
"indiscriminately transferred" 6 to campus situations. Instead it
must be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment." These special characteristics (or variables) demand what amounts to a "sliding-scale approach" to
administrative restriction of campus speech, where more latitude
is allowed with (1) peaceful, unobstructive protests, (2) in nonaspeech . . .should be less rigorous outside of the classroom, because there is no direct
interference with the close-knit and disciplined teacher-student relationship which is
required in the classroom."
"And even here it was on a college rather than a high school campus.
"See The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 35, at 160 n.34. See generally
Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1148 (1961).
"As in Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1336 (D. Mass. 1970), "there has
been no showing that the harm from . . .[controversial speech] in a college setting is so
much greater than in the public forum that it outweighs the danger to free expression
inherent in" adopting a more restrictive rule for campus expression.
"See Beaney, Students, Higher Education, and the Law, 45 DENVER L.J. 511, 513-17
(1968); Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 590, 591 n.22, citing Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp.
280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968): "We agree with the students that the doctrine of 'In Loco
Parentis' is no longer tenable in a university community."; Note, The Emerging Law of
Student Rights, 23 ARK. L. REv. 619, 632 (1970).
"Wright, supra note 40, at 1042. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972): "Yet,
the precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged
need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college
campuses than in the community at large."
"Wright, supra note 40, at 1038.
"Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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cademic settings, (3) during nonschool hours, (4) at the college
level, and so forth.7" This approach allows the specific circumstances of each case to determine the degree of restriction called
for, rather than leaving it to the debilitating uncertainty of arbitrary discretion.79 It likewise avoids an unduly expansive and obscurative construction of the "rights of others" exception in situations where reflexive, uncritical adherence to it would operate
0 Otherwise the
only to circumvent the spirit and logic of Tinker."
Tinker standard for campus expression may serve all too readily
as a tool for the dilution of the first amendment rights of students.
Religious Criticism by Private Individuals
While the planned protest in Williams would not have interfered with the educational "rights of others" (or with normal
school activities), it might still be argued that Mormon fans at
the game had a right "to be secure and to be let alone"'" in their
religious beliefs. It is clear, however, that there is no such right:
D.

[Tihe state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify
prior restraints upon the expression of those views. It is not the
business of government in our nation to suppress real or imagined
attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in
publications, speeches, or motion pictures."

This opinion (along with those cited in the note) stands for a first
amendment "right to speak" on religious matters, even though
the protected expression may not always be supportive of religious doctrine. 3
7

And as observed above, the "special characteristics" which permit restriction of
speech in some campus situations are simply not present in Williams.
7
Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 582 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting):
"When a violation of First Amendment rights is alleged, the reasons for [restriction]
must be examined to see if the reasons given are only a cloak for activity or attitudes
protected by the Constitution."
"The inherent ambiguity in the term "rights of others" brings to mind the "familiar
dangers to first amendment freedoms often associated with vague statutes." Eisner v.
Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 808 (2d Cir. 1971).
"Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). The district court in Williams stated
it this way: "Such protest would have been further violative of... Article 21, Section 25
of the Wyoming Constitution which guarantees perfect toleration of religious sentiment,
and provides that no inhabitant of the State of Wyoming shall ever be molested in person
...
333 F. Supp. 107, 113-14 (D.
or property on account of his or her mode of worship.
Wyo. 1971).
"Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1951). See Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940): "Equally obvious
is it that a State may not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or other,
under the guise of conserving desirable conditions."
"Indeed, many modern denominations are themselves the end result of religious
protest.
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Under Beauharnaisv. Illinois," however, where the publication of one's private views involves expression in the nature of
"group libel," the result might be different, for libel is one of
several classes of speech which are of "slight social value as a step
to truth."8 So libelous utterances are not a protected form of free
speech, and therefore may be restricted upon a showing of something less than a clear and present danger.u
In determining whether the Williams protest would have involved "group libel," one need only again refer to the circumstances under which it would have been conducted and the character
of its expression. Beauharnaisinvolved speech which was unprovoked, served no useful function, and was calculated to offend.
The Williams protest, on the other hand, was provoked by relegation to inferior status, had social value for political purposes, and
was designed to symbolize opposition to racial discrimination
rather than simply to disseminate malicious and gratuitous
invective in the form of religious profanation.87
In short, it was to be a "silent, passive expression of opinion"88 on a policy which classifies people on racial grounds, and
-343 U.S. 250 (1952).
'Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
8
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). But note the dissent of Mr. Justice
Black: "Every expansion of the law of criminal libel so as to punish discussions of matters
of public concern means a corresponding invasion of the area dedicated to free expression
by the First Amendment." Id. at 272.
"7It was intended merely as a passive and rational means of dramatizing the agreement of the athletes with other black students on campus, all of whom were protesting
what they perceived as their disparagement by Mormons. Moreover, Beauharnaisis limited to libel itself, not mere hostile protest. See Kalemba v. Turk, 353 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D.
Ohio 1973): "Defendants urge the Court to carve out a new exception under the First
Amendment for expressions which are derogatory to a particular race [or religion] on the
grounds that this country has adopted a policy of racial equality. . . . However, the Court
rejects the proposition of limiting free speech to those who will support the national policy,
however important. Indeed, the result of such a limitation would be the curtailment of
all speech related to black power and superiority as well as, in this case, the advocates of
white superiority." Id. at 1103-04. "While defendants cite Beauharnais v. Illinois . . . in
support of their contention that racially degrading speech is not protected, the Court
disagrees and considers that case as one limited to libelous statements, a situation not
presented by this case" which involved the wearing of swastika armbands. Id. at 1104 n.1.
"Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). Contrast this with the vitriolic
attacks protected in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1 (1949); and Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 296 (1951): "Kunz preached...
that 'The Catholic Church makes merchandise out of souls,' that Catholicism is 'a religion
of the devil,' and that the Pope is 'the anti-Christ.' The Jews he denounced as 'Christkillers,' and he said of them, 'All the garbage that didn't believe in Christ should have
been burnt in the incinerators. It's a shame they all weren't.'"
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therefore could most accurately be viewed as a traditional civil
rights protest.89 It would have taken on religious implications, but
only because the discrimination being protested was religiously
sanctioned. It might also have proved unsettling to many in the
crowd, but the "essential feature" of any civil rights demonstration is an "appeal to public opinion." 90 Whatever offensive or
controversial effect it may have had on Mormons in the stands
would have been incidental to a constitutionally protected privilege to speak on the issue involved." While there is a collateral
right to prevent coercion" with regard to the conduct of a church's
religious activities (or the religious beliefs of individuals), there
is no right to forestall private criticism in a secular forum. 3
"Indeed, it was not unlike the protests in Burnside and Blackwell, which occurred
near Philadelphia, Mississippi, where three civil rights workers-Andrew Goodman, Michael Schwerner, and James Chaney-had previously been killed.
"Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1,
11, citing Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring):
There was more to the conduct of those petitioners than a bare desire to
remain at the "white" lunch counter .... We would surely have to be blind
not to recognize that petitioners were sitting at these counters. . . to demonstrate that their race was being segregated in dining facilities in this part of
the country.
Such a demonstration . . . is as much a part of the "free trade of ideas"
. . .as is verbal expression, more commonly thought of as "speech." It, like
speech, appeals to good sense and to "the power of reason as applied through
public discussion" . . . just as much as, if not more than, a public oration
delivered from a soapbox at a street corner.
"Although some Mormon football fans might have been offended by a protest of this
kind, that could well be viewed as the price of free speech in a free society (or the price of
racial discrimination). Indeed, those who supported racial discrimination must have been
equally offended by the civil rights protests of the Sixties.
"Coercion in the sense of compelling others to violate their religious scruples. See
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965);
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940). But see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), where the practice
of polygamy by Mormons was held violative of an overriding public interest.
"3This might be analogized to Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,
419-20 (1971), where it was held that even though a person's right of privacy may sometimes enable him "to stop the flow of information into his own household," there is no
comparable right to halt the communication of information about him to the general
public. Cf. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
Note also the decision in Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 7,
434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967), which denied the contention of a public transit
authority that political advertisements on its buses would make a "captive audience" of
its passengers. The court went on to comment that "a passenger on a public conveyance
does not possess the same rights of privacy as he does in his home; his rights are subject
to reasonable limitations in relation to the rights of others" to express their views. 434 P.2d
at 988-89 n.3, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 436-37 n.3 (emphasis added). Cf. Public Utilities Comm'n
v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 464 (1952).
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It seems clear, then, that the Williams protest could not have
been prohibited merely because the university hoped to protect
Mormon spectators from "hostile expression." As explained in
Tinker itself:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opiniorr, it must be able to
.show that its action was caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint .
•

. .

[In the present case] the action of the school authorities

appears to have been based upon an urgent wish to avoid the controversy which might result from [disputatious] expression ....
* . . [There was no] specific showing of constitutionally valid
reasons to regulate [student] speech . . . . [S]chool officials can-

not suppress "expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to
contend.""

In effect, this serves to restate the requirement that school officials must be able to forecast invasion of a legally protected right
before exercising their authority under the "rights of others" exception. To allow the mere elicitation of "discomfort and unpleasantness" from a civil rights protest to serve as a "constitutionally
valid reason" for suppressing freedom of speech is to overlook the
constitutional history of the first amendment9 5 and seriously mis"1393 U.S. at 509, 510, 511, quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966).
"See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (cited with approval in Tinker).
Note also the warning of Mr. Justice Douglas in Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 56 (1966)
(dissenting opinion) (footnotes omitted):

Today a trespass law is used to penalize people for exercising a constitutional
right. Tomorrow a disorderly conduct statute, a breach of the peace statute,
a vagrancy statute will be put to the same end. It is said that the sheriff did
not make the arrests because of the views which petitioners espoused. That
excuse is usually given, as we know from the many cases involving arrests of
minority groups for breaches of the peace, unlawful assemblies, and parading
without a permit ....
[S]uch arrests are usually sought to be justified by
some legitimate function of government. Yet by allowing these orderly and
civilized protests against injustice to be suppressed, we only increase the
forces of frustration which the conditions of second-class citizenship are
generating amongst us.
See also Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 14 n.7 (7th Cir. 1970): "Ill-considered
suppression carries its own dangers. For example, in Blackwell . . . three students wore
the challenged freedom buttons on Friday. They were taken to the principal who ordered
the buttons removed. The three refused to do so and were suspended. On Monday 150
students wore the buttons."
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construe the import of Tinker.
"Representatives" of the State
The heart of the Williams decision, however, seemed to be
that the expression involved possessed "a greater capacity for
evil""6 in that the protesting athletes were "representatives" of a
state university. And under the "rights of others" exception, the
court suggested, views expressed in this representative capacity
may be restricted, since there is a legal right to demand that
school officials restrict "hostile expressions against religious beliefs of others by representatives of a state or its agencies." 97 Or,
viewed from a different perspective, if a state university failed to
prevent members of its football team from using a state-owned
stadium as a forum in which to protest Mormon racial policy, it
would be "facilitating" religious criticism through "state inaction," thereby involving the state impermissibly in what would
otherwise be protected private expression."
E.

1. Freedom of the Press Analogy
It will be helpful in testing the merits of this argument to
analogize it to student use of another state-owned forum-the
university newspaper. In all probability the University of Wyoming newspaper could have criticized Mormon racial policy editorially or could have allowed an article or letter to be published
which did so. A recent New York decision, Panarella v.
Birenbaum," provides a case in point. There a student newspaper
at a state-operated college'00 published an article attacking the
"Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
11468 F.2d at 1083.
"As previously noted (see textual discussion accompanying note 13 supra), the
Williams court stated that it would be unnecessary to consider "state action" in deciding
the case. However, some variation of that concept was clearly essential to the result
reached, since expression which would have been permissible if purely private was restricted because those involved were held "representatives" of the state. Cf. Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
"-32 N.Y.2d 108, 296 N.E.2d 238, 343 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1973), 37 App. Div. 2d 987, 327
N.Y.S.2d 755 (1971), rev'g 60 Misc. 2d 95, 302 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
'"As stated at the trial court level:
The basic facts are not in dispute. Both schools are tax-supported institutions. Both publications display the official seal of the City University of
New York; both have faculty members as advisors; both are funded in part
by a mandatory fee collected from the students; both have office space and
telephones on the campus; the official student handbook at both institutions
promotes the publications.
302 N.Y.S.2d at 429 (emphasis added).
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Catholic Church.' An action was then brought by a student and
his father to compel school officials "to adopt and enforce regulations prohibiting derogatory and blasphemous attacks on religion
in student publications.' "' 0 The trial court sustained this petition, basing its decision on the admitted use of State property,
facilities, and employees for what the court saw as an attack on
religion: "A government that finances religion is no longer neutral. Similarly, a government that underwrites attacks on religion
is no longer neutral." 3 The court then reconciled its finding with
the Tinker standard:
The recent case of Tinker v. Des Moines School District ... is
not at variance with these principles.
The petitioners herein have made a "showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate" the contents of these publications-they have shown that the strict neutrality required of government vis a vis religion has not been preserved. The published articles also "collid[ed] with the rights of others," that is, the petitioners' right to have the state refrain from attacking religion.' 5 '

The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court,
however, subsequently overruled this interpretation, despite the
involvement of government facilities:
It has repeatedly been held that, once having established . . . a
forum, the authorities may not then place limitations upon its use
which infringe upon the [first amendment] rights of the students

There is no showing herein . . . that publication of the matter
sought to be suppressed constitutes a threat to the orderly functioning of these institutions. 0 '
"'The case actually involved two student-written articles at separate schools. The one
referred to in the text was entitled "The Catholic Church-Cancer of Society." 302
N.Y.S.2d at 428.
2
10
d.
'"tId. at 431.
"'Id. at 431-32. Note that this is almost precisely the ruling in Williams.
1"37 App. Div. 2d 987, 988, 999, 327 N.Y.S.2d 755, 757, 758 (1971) (4-1 decision), citing
Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966);
Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Colo. 1971); Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D.
Md. 1970); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970); Lee v. Board of
Regents of State Colleges, 306 F. Supp. 1097 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F.
Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613
(M.D. Ala. 1967).
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Upon further appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division:
Tax-supported colleges may provide financial assistance for a student newspaper publishing an occasional article attacking religious
beliefs, so long as the nature of the attack is arguably within constitutionally protected publication. The colleges merely provided a
neutral forum for debate, and did not evidence an intent to advance
or destroy religious beliefs. Only if the colleges continued financial
support to a newspaper systematically attacking religion over a period of time, without balance, might there be an attempt to "establish" a "secular religion."'0

Panarellais apparently the only other reported post-Tinker
decision to consider the precise issue of the use of state-owned
facilities for student criticism of religious doctrine. Its implicit
rejection of the lower court's application of the "rights of others"
exception is therefore especially significant. Moreover, it indirectly emphasizes the logical contradiction of holding the passive,
symbolic views represented by the Williams armband less worthy
of constitutional protection than the rather vitriolic opinions expressed in the Panarellaarticle, although each involved "student
extracurricular expression"'' 7 through state-owned facilities.
Surely student expression critical of religious policy is no more
pervasive or affronting if communicated through an armband
rather than a school newspaper. If this expression by one kind of
school "representative" is protected, the state must provide a
"constitutionally valid reason" for denying the same freedom to
others. 08 Yet the reasons advanced in Williams, even viewed in
--32 N.Y.2d 108, 112, 296 N.E.2d 238, 239, 343 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (1973) (6-1 decision).
"'Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 5, at 1129.
1"And clearly the mere use of "state facilities" as a forum for expression cannot serve
as a valid reason. See, e.g., Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138, 143 (D. Md. 1970): "The
fact that the University is involved in the financing of ...
[the school paper] does not
permit its officials to apply a statute unconstitutionally."; Channing Club v. Board of
Regents, 317 F. Supp. 688, 692 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp.
1329, 1337 (D. Mass. 1970): "We are well beyond the belief that any manner of state
regulation is permissible simply because it involves an activity which is a part of the
university structure and is financed with funds controlled by the administration. The state
is not necessarily the unrestrained master of what it creates and fosters." Thus, "the
creation of the form does not give birth also to the power to mold its substance." For this
reason, "there is no right to editorial control by administration officials flowing from the
fact that ...
[the school paper] is college sponsored and state supported ....
; Dickey
v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967); Buckley v. Meng, 35
Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Developments in the Law-Academic
Freedom, supra note 5, at 1129-30. Cf. Palacios v. Foltz, 441 F.2d 1196, 1198 (10th Cir.
1971): "The State of New Mexico's regulatory powers over Las Cruces Public School do
not necessarily implicate the state with the student council's by-laws nor with the action
by the 'principal's office' pursuant thereto."
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light of the difference in circumstances, were nearly identical to
those relied upon by the lower court in Panarella-andrejected
by the appellate courts."'
In effect, then, there is no apparent constitutional basis for
distinguishing between the student expression in Williams and
Panarella.""Indeed, to allow students to communicate views critical of Mormon racial policy while "representing" a state school
through their editorial positions on a school newspaper, yet deny
this right to other students while similarly engaged in extracurricular activity, would suggest the kind of selective enforcement
often held to constitute due process inconsistency."' For this reason, all forms of extracurricular speech must be analyzed under
a single standard.
The applicable standard is apparent from the case law on
student expression. The clear import of the decisions dealing with
the use of school facilities for expressive purposes is that their
utilization may not be restricted except in accord with "the
guidelines of traditional first amendment theory":" 2
'"For example, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, in a 4-1
decision, declined to follow the argument of the one dissenting judge that freedom of
speech "must give way to the right of other students to be free from ridicule about their
religious beliefs." 37 App. Div. 2d 987, 989-90, 327 N.Y.2d 755, 759 (1971).
"'As for the potential argument that the function of a student newspaper is to accommodate student expression, while that is not the function of a school stadium, see text
accompanying notes 131-41 infra.
"'Cf. Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 362-63 (1st Cir. 1969): "It is hard to think that
any student could walk into the library and receive a book, but that his teacher could not
subject the content to serious discussion in class. . . . Such inconsistency on the part of
the school has been regarded as fatal."; Channing Club v. Board of Regents, 317 F. Supp.
688, 692 (N.D. Tex. 1970): "[Nlumerous other publications, not banned, and sold from
the same location as The Catalyst, contained language identical to that objected to here
which doe's sustain the allegation of discrimination and denial of equal protection. There
thus being no legal distinction between the types of publications, the State does not
become privileged to ban a publication merely because it is edited and published by
students."; American Civil Liberties Union v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893, 896-97
(W.D. Va. 1970); Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388, 1393-96 (E.D.
Mich. 1969) (student's expulsion for possession of allegedly obscene literature on campus
was held "rank inconsistency" and a denial of due process, since identical expletives were
contained in other literature in the school library); Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230
N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (school regulation calling for substitution of personal discretion by administration officials held too indefinite).
"'Abbott, supra note 53, at 993. As expressed in American Civil Liberties Union v.
Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893, 896 (W.D. Va. 1970):
A perusal of these cases makes clear a recurring theme that once a public
school makes an activity available to its students, faculty, or even the general public, it must operate the activity in accord with first amendment
principles.
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The notion that the state can condition the grant of a privilege on
the surrender of a constitutional right without compelling justification has been discredited by the Supreme Court in other areas, and
by several lower federal courts in the context of student rights [and
subsequently by Tinker]. With the removal of this obstacle to judicial relief, school regulations restricting student extracurricular
speech and association will be subjected to the requirements of the
first amendment."'

So a student does not retain his first amendment rights in some
extracurricular activities, yet automatically forfeit them in others." 4 This is really the only defensible reading of Tinker, which
specifically noted that a student's constitutional rights apply uniformly to all phases of school life:
A student's rights. . . do not embrace merely the classroom hours.
When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus
during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on
controversial subjects . . . . if he does so without.., colliding with
the rights of others." 5

It logically follows, then, that the state interest needed to restrict
a student's constitutional rights (i.e., protection of the rights of
others) must also be applied uniformly. A comparison of Williams
and Panarella,however, suggests only the lack of uniformity in
this regard. If the state's interest in protecting the rights of others
is somehow distinguishable in these two instances, school authorities must bear the burden of proving the "material and
qubstantial"' 1 nature of this distinction. And if they cannot sustain this burden, there is no "valid university interest""' 7 by
which they can legitimately restrict student expression.
2. Disavowal
A related argument for showing this "valid university interest" is that the Williams protest would necessarily have cast a
negative "reflection" on the University of Wyoming, and through
it perhaps even the State itself. More specifically stated, this
" 3Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 5, at 1129. See Jones v.
State Bd. of Educ., 397 U.S. 31, 34 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (numerous authorities
cited).
"'Cf. Note, Student Academic Freedom-"StateAction" and PrivateUniversities, 44
TUL. L. REv. 184 (1969): "The decision of this case, resulting in a 'schizophrenic' student
body, some of whom appear to have constitutionally protected rights while the others do
not, seems peculiar in itself."

1-5393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969).
"Id.; Vail v. Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592, 598 (D.N.H. 1973) (emphasis added).
"'Channing Club v. Board of Regents, 315 F. Supp. 688, 691 (N.D. Tex. 1970).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 51

contention arises from the fact that the athletes would have been
wearing school uniforms while protesting, and thereby would
have been "representing" the State in a unique and more apparent way."8 It seems well established, however, that schools and

other government agencies do not somehow become "advocates"
of private opinions expressed on public property."9 To hold other"'Cf. Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1970), where a statute which
permitted the wearing of a military uniform in a theatrical production only "if the portrayal does not tend to discredit" the armed forces was held unconstitutional as a violation
of free speech.
I"In Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 7, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 430 (1967), for example, this issue was discussed as follows:
Defendants assert that the overriding consideration impelling them to
adopt the present [restrictive] policy is the necessity to keep the Government outside the arena of partisan affairs and the acceptance of [antiwar]
advertising . . . might give the impression that the district endorses the
views of the advertiser ....
These pragmatic hurdles are no more relevant to a public forum when
it is a motor coach than they are to a public park or a school auditorium.
The endorsement of an opinion expressed in an advertisement on a motor
coach is no more attributable to the transit district than the view of a speaker
in a public park is to the city administration or the tenets of an organization
using school property for meetings is to the local school board ....
Likewise, the defendants' apprehensions relating to the content of the
messages they would be required to accept are no more significant than those
involved in . . .the making of speeches in the parks and schools. In any
event, the right to utilize a public forum for the expression of opinions and
beliefs cannot be made to depend upon such ephemeral concerns.
It will undoubtedly be true. . . that an occasional advertiser may post
controversial messages which will offend some, perhaps a majority, in the
community. . . .Annoyance and inconvenience, however, are a small price
to pay for preservation of our most cherished right.
Defendants' potential problem of "equal time" for conflicting views is a
straw man. . . . [Clonstitutional standards are satisfied if all those who
wish to exercise their right to state beliefs and opinions protected by the First
Amendment are permitted to do so on an equal basis.
434 P.2d at 989-90, 64 Cal. Rptr. 437-38. (emphasis added).
Consider also Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962),
where a regulation governing use of school facilities at a public college provided that
programs there must be "determined to be compatible with the aims" of the school. In
applying these regulations, the Dean of Administration stated that the National Review
was "a political group presenting a distinct point of view of its own" and therefore the
college could not allow its facilities "to serve as a forum for such political groups," since
their viewpoint was "opposed by substantial parts of the public." The rationale offered
in support of the regulation was that "academic institutions of a public character must
avoid giving the appearance or creating the suspicion that they favor particular movements or groups over other groups opposed to their positions or their points of view." Id.
at 468-69, 471, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 927, 930. In deciding the case, the court noted that the
school's "motives are . . .to avoid identification with any minority position," but "as
well-intentioned as these aims are, they evidence a temper of mind. . . incompatible with
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wise would be to stifle minority opinion indirectly through a convenient rationalization of government restriction as being necessary to the public interest.
And even aside from the university's legal connection with
the protest, it could also have neutralized any consequent "impression" of school-sanctioned hostility to Mormons through. a
timely public disavowal of any position on the views expressed. 2"
In this way the university officials could have convincingly disasthe philosophy of the First Amendment." Id. at 473, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 932.
This same issue was raised in National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers,
where it was observed:
The state action doctrine has never been thought to extend to cases where
the streets, parks and public meeting places of a particular community are
utilized for the exercise of first amendment rights . . . . No case suggests
that in maintaining a street, park or public meeting place, a state espouses
the views which may be there expressed ...
The essential point here is not that there is insufficient state action, but
simply that the state action doctrine is not applicable where a group seeks
to exercise first amendment rights in a public forum [partially] dedicated
to that purpose ....
473 F.2d 1010, 1016-17 (4th Cir. 1973) (footnote omitted).
We are confident that if the high school auditorium is made available
to all groups, the very diversity and complexity of the views expressed, taken
in bulk, will cure any incidental official identification attendant upon the
use of the building for the articulation of extreme or abusive speech. At least
that is the principle on which we have staked our all.
Id. at 1018 (footnote omitted).
See Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972): "If this
right could be exercised only when government is willing to offer its co-sponsorship to the
speaker, a system of free expression would be indistinguishable from a system of prior
restraint."; Tate v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 975, 980, 982 (8th Cir. 1972): In protesting
the playing of "Dixie" as the school song, plaintiffs urged that "the right to free speech
does not give rise to the right to publicly insult or defame ....
" Yet the court held "we
cannot say that the . . . playing of the tune . . . officially sanctioned racial abuse."; Veed
v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149, 152 (D. Neb. 1973): The plaintiff argued "that in its
program of supporting extracurricular speakers and a student newspaper the university
assumes the role of advocate for the particular philosophy expressed . . . . The evidence
is to the contrary," for no editorial control is exercised over these views. "Indeed, such
control by the university would raise grave constitutional questions."; Panarella v. Birenbaum, 60 Misc. 2d 95, 302 N.Y.S. 2d 427 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (emphasis on display of the
"school seal" and use of school facilities, allegedly resulting in placing "the imprimatur
of the state" on the contested school expression, not followed by two appellate courts in
considering same case); Stanton v. Board of Educ., 190 Misc. 1012, 76 N.Y.S.2d 559 (Sup.
Ct. 1948) (board's refusal to adopt resolution denying use of school and grounds to Communists, Nazis, Fascists, or an organization that fosters racial or religious intolerance
upheld).
""See Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 7: "Indeed, the
[government transit] district is more insulated from implied endorsement since it can,
and in the instant case does, require a disclaimerin the text of the advertisements submitted to it." 434 P.2d 982, 989, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430, 437. (emphasis added).
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sociated the school from the content of the protest, while continuing to extend to the student athletes the full range of liberty
traditionally associated with freedom of speech and the right to
dissent.
With this alternative available, then, a game with Brigham
Young University should have been viewed as a particularly logical and defensible occasion for publicizing dissenting views directly related to Mormon policy. And therefore the conflict in
Williams between religious conviction and political conviction
was an unavoidable aspect of the first amendment obligation of
a university to serve as a public forum,' 2 ' since that constitutional
function entails an equal and impartial accommodation of expression by all students who choose to use school property in a
peaceful, unobstructive manner to communicate legitimately felt
dissent.'2 2
Viewed in this light, the action of the school officials in
Williams seems considerably less justified, since one indispensable prerequisite for government regulation of expression is that
the restriction involved be "no greater than is essential to the
furtherance" of the governmental interest. ' Here a firm public
'2 Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969); United States v. Gourley, 502
F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1973) (right of civilians to enter "public areas" of Air Force
Academy for purpose of exercising their first amendment rights outside football stadium
upheld); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Hammond v. South
Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967) (cited with approval in Tinker);
Abbott, supra note 53, at 19: Hammond "indicated that a college campus is sufficiently
analogous to the 'site of state government' which has been given constitutional protection
for purposes of a demonstration by the Supreme Court, and is thus to be distinguished
from Adderley v. Florida," which involved public property dedicated to a special use
incompatible with the normal standard for free expression.; Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 953 (1963): "The most common form
of governmental assistance to freedom of expression is the furnishing of facilities for
communication. Traditionally streets, parks, commons and similar open public places
have been used for meetings, parades and other forms of expression. Clearly there should
be a right for any person or group to use such public property, subject only to restrictions
of the traffic control type."; Kalven, supra note 90; Nahmod, supra note 50, at 293-300:
"Hammond v. South CarolinaState College indicates ...
that a college campus is to be
treated as a first amendment forum for peaceful demonstrations." Cf. Amalgamated Food
Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth.,
392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968).
' 22Emerson, supra note 121, at 953: Once public property has been made available to
the public, it "should be open to all on an equal basis; no differentiation based upon the
content of the expression is permissible." (emphasis added).
'=United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, (1968) (emphasis added). See Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960): "[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle funda-
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disavowal would have been a "less drastic alternative" by which
the university could have remained neutral politically and religiously. 24 Since it is "incumbent upon . . .[the government] to
demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would . . .
[protect the government's position of neutrality] without infringing First Amendment rights,' 25 it would appear that the
state interest advanced in Williams could have been more narrowly achieved.
3. University "Representation"
The University of Wyoming's argument might be analyzed
further by applying its reasoning to a situation where one of its
professors (as a contractual "representative" of the state) decides
to wear an armband to his classroom (a publicly owned facility
or forum) to protest Mormon racial policy. Under those circumstances it would seem considerably easier to establish a legal
"connection" with the state. Yet even here the professor/representative in all likelihood would prevail on the basis of
academic freedom.
This general issue was tested in the recent case of James v.
Board of Education of Central District No. 1,126 where it was
recognized that "a high school teacher, despite the influential
position he holds in the classroom, does not forefeit his right to
mental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. . . .[Restriction
of speech] must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
purpose."; Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156, 165 (E.D. Ark. 1972): "It should be emphasized . . .that any such restriction [of student expression] must not exceed that which
is absolutely necessary to carry out [the school's] legitimate objectives." (emphasis
added); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 7, 434 P.2d 982, 989, 64
Cal. Rptr. 430, 437 (1967): "In the realm of the First Amendment, no governmental agency
is permitted to burn down the house to roast a pig."; Kalven, "Uninhibited, Robust, and
Wide-Open"--A Note on Free Speech and the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REv. 289, 299
is not enough that the end be legitimate; the
(1968): Where speech is regulated, "[i]t
means must not be wasteful of first amendment values."
"'Refer again to the quotation from Panarellaaccompanying note 106 supra, where
it was observed: "The colleges merely provided a neutral forum for debate, and did not
evidence an intent to advance or destroy religious beliefs." 32 N.Y.2d 108, 112, 296 N.E.2d
238, 239, 343 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (1973).
"Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963): "Precision of regulation must be the
touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms."; Russo v. Central
School Dist., 469 F.2d 623, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1973); Butts v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 436
F.2d 728, 732 (5th Cir. 1971): In Tinker, "the Supreme Court has declared a constitutional
right which school authorities must nurture and protect, not extinguish, unless they find
the circumstances allow them no practical alternative."
125461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
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exercise his freedom of speech there because of that position.",7
So long as the expression "is not coercive and does not arbitrarily
inculcate doctrinaire views in the minds of the students," ' it
cannot be restricted without a substantial showing of interference
with the educational process or the teacher's obligation to
educate.
Therefore, as in Tinker, "[iut can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school house gate."'2 9 In short,
expression on campus by either students or teachers is protected
by "correlative first amendment rights," in that "the considerations called into play are the same whether the right asserted is
' 3
freedom of speech or academic freedom. '
The question, then, is why a salaried employee of a state
university can criticize Mormon racial policy, even when acting
under a legally binding relationship with the state in a publicly
owned classroom, while student athletes with a much more remote and conjectural connection with the state cannot. In response, the proposition could be advanced that discussion of this
type is the primary function of a classroom (or of the newspaper
in Panarella), while it is not the function of a stadium (or of a
student athlete). Yet this would merely be an indirect way of
saying that students forfeit their right of free expression when not
in the classroom. And, to quote Tinker once again, a school cannot "confine the permissible exercise of First Amendment rights
to . . .supervised and ordained discussion in a school classroom."'13 ' The student does not "shed" these rights either "at the
schoolhouse gate," during classroom hours, "in the cafeteria, . . .on the playing field, or on the campus ... ."I, Nor,
by analogy, should student athletes shed their constitutional
"7Comment, Discharging Teacherfor Wearing Armband Violates FirstAmendment
Right of Free Speech, 7 SUFF. L. REv. 197, 210 (1971) (emphasis added). Cf. Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967); Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972).
'2 'James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1972).
'z 9Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
'"Comment, supra note 127, at 205 & n.39, citing Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp.
352, 355 (M.D. Ala. 1970). See Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623, 631 (2d Cir.
1972): "[Tjhe school board, as it did in James v. Board of Education, would have us
decide that the rights enjoyed by school children are broader than the First Amendment
rights of their teachers. [As in] James, we decline[d] that invitation."
'393 U.S. at 513.
"'Id. at 506, 512-13.
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rights at the fieldhouse gate. By necessary implication, the right
of free expression is retained throughout all of a student's endeavors, including participation in an extracurricular activity such as
33
football.
Though the Williams protest might well have been planned
for a location other than the stadium, that is essentially insignificant so long as it promised to be peaceful and unobstructive.
Thus, as explained by one authority:
[T]hough students arguably have other means of protesting educational policies-for example, through their parents or, as could have
been done. . . in Tinker, by wearing bands off school premises-the
availability of other alternatives is constitutionally less relevant in
"pure speech" cases [like Williams] than where conduct is involved. Furthermore, the relevant audience is not the same when
these alternatives are pursued."'

Some public property, due to the particular nature of the use to
which it is dedicated, can be reserved for "nonexpressive purposes.' ' 3 Tinker, however, viewed school property as a "public
place.' ' 36 So the public forum right clearly extends to a school
stadium.' 37 Indeed, the "mass communication potential' 3 of the
'3The opportunity to participate in intercollegiate athletic competition
must be considered, even in this day of relevancy and change on college
campuses as an important aspect of the overall educational program offered
by the University of California at Berkeley.
Curtis v. NCAA, No. C-71-2088-ACW (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 29, 1971), quoted in Reply
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1070 (10th Cir. 1672).
34
1 Nahmod, supra note 50, at 281 (citing Tinker). See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 163 (1939): "[Olne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."; Lee v.
Board of Regents of State Colleges, 306 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (W.D. Wis. 1969): Since "a
paid advertisement can be cast in such a form as to command much greater attention than
a letter to the editor," the fact that plaintiffs could have published their political views
in the letters column was held insignificant; Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 546-47, 171 P.2d 885,
892 (1946): "Once [a school] opens its doors [as a forum] ... it cannot demand tickets
of admission in the form of convictions and affiliations that it deems acceptable. Censorship of those who would use the school building as a forum cannot be rationalized by
reference to its setting. School desks and blackboards, like trees or street lights, are but
the trappings of the forum; what imports is the meeting of minds and not the meeting
place."
'"See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
'36393 U.S. at 512 n.6, citing Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp.
947 (D.S.C. 1967).

"'37In National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, which involved a controver-

sial political party's request to use a public school auditorium, the Fourth Circuit observed:
[The first] amendment's protections cannot be made to turn on structural
distinctions between, for example, an open public park, a public amphi-
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occasion and the relatively undisruptable nature of the school
activity being conducted make it an unusually effective and desirable setting in which to publicize symbolic dissent.' And as
another federal court has observed:
It is patently unfair in light of the free speech doctrine to close to
the students the forum which they deem effective to present their
ideas. The rationale of Tinker carries beyond the facts in that case.lu

Wyoming officials may have wanted only to funnel the protest into what they deemed "less offensive channels" of commutheatre, a public stadium, or an enclosed public auditorium. While limitations on its use as a forum to permit it to serve its prime function (school
purposes) . . . may be sustained, regulation which limits the exercise of first
amendment guarantees should be stricken down.
. . . Specifically, the expression of racist and anti-semitic views in a public
place . . . [is] protected activit[y] and may not be circumscribed by the
state, except where "advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."
473 F.2d 1010, 1015 (4th Cir. 1973) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted), quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Cf. Pollitt, Free Speech for Mustangs and
Mavericks, 46 N.C.L. REv. 39, 43-46 (1967).
See United States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d 785 (10th Cir., 1973) (right of civilians to enter
"public areas" of Air Force Academy for purposes of exercising their first amendment
rights outside school football stadium upheld); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.
W.Va. 1968) (peaceful demonstration at halftime of football game protected, but right

exceeded where protest became violent); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist.,
68 Cal. 2d 7, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967); Denno, supra note 36, at 59: "Virtually
all the public facilities and institutions in the country have been opened to the presence
of the first amendment ..
"; Homing, The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum,
1969 DUKE L.J. 931, 946: "It would seem clear that the public forum right extends to
streets and parks, subways, mass transportation terminals, mass entertainment areas,
school buildings and grounds, and grounds of general governmental buildings." But cf.
A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 46-47 (1968): School buildings
may not be used "in a way which subverts their purpose and prevents their intended use
by others."
'38Horning, supra note 137, at 948 (describes the public forum right as "a 'constitu-

tional3 obligation' flowing out of the first amendment").
' See Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 1968): "The [Bus]
Terminal building is an appropriate place for expressing one's views precisely because the

primary activity for which it is designed is attended with noisy crowds and vehicles, some
unrest and less than perfect order." Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972);
Hicks v. State, 294 N.E.2d 613, 616 (Ind. 1973).

110Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See Tinker v. Des Moines,

393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969): "Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given
only to be so circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in fact. . . . [W]e do not
confine the permissible exercise of First Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the
four corners of a pamphlet, or to supervised and ordained discussion in a school classroom."; Los Angeles Teachers Union v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 71 Cal. 2d 551,
559, 455 P.2d 827, 832-33, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723, 728-29 (1969) (the first amendment contemplates effective communication).
A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT
may
073

AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

46-47 (1968): School buildings
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nication,"4 I but the black athletes in Williams viewed the
Brigham Young game as their single most promising opportunity
to dramatize their feelings about Mormon racial policy to Mormons themselves. Students normally do not have ready access to
the more traditional, and expensive, means of communication by
which public opinion is influenced. As Wyoming football players,
however, these particular students did command considerable
public attention. As in James, their "influential position" should
not serve of itself to deprive them of their right to communicate
their views, particularly when both the content and mode of their
expression were responsible, nondisruptive, and logically related
to the occasion.
Social problems often can best be solved by allowing a
healthy conflict of first amendment rights:
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp
differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the
rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point
of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration,
to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or
state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have
ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of
excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential
to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens
12
of a democracy.

In other words, the open expression of opinion, even on religious
matters, is basic both to freedom of speech and the shaping of
"'That is, they may have been willing to allow the wearing of armbands during times
when the athletes were not "representing" the school.
"'Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). See Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576, 593 (1969): "We have no doubt that the constitutionally guaranteed 'freedom to be
intellectually . . . diverse or even contrary' . . . encompass[es] the freedom to express
publicly . . . those opinions which are defiant or contemptuous."; Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965), quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949):
"[Plersons [may not] be punished merely for peacefully expressing unpopular views
....
[A] 'function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.
It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often
provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of
speech ...
is ...
protected against censorship or punishment ....
There is no room
under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to
standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community
groups.' "; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964): There is "a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks ....
"
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public opinion. Surely responsible free expression is equally in
keeping with the traditional role and function of a university:
"The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more
vital than in the community of American schools." The classroom
["with its surrounding environs"]"1 is peculiarly the "marketplace
of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
"out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind
of
authoritative selection.""'

4. Private Capacity of Students
Clearly neither the State nor the University of Wyoming were
purposely utilizing publicly owned property to facilitate religious
criticism. The protest was neither prescribed nor mandated by
the State, nor was it conducted at the request of or under any
form of encouragement from the state. Instead it was privately
initiated and merely used State property as a forum for its expression. As emphasized previously, it was merely a peaceful, silent
protest, individually felt and individually expressed.' The participating students did "represent" both the State and the school
in an athletic capacity, but not in an individual capacity and
certainly not in the expression of their private beliefs.' Students
1'3This phrase was added by Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
"'Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citations omitted). See
Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1336 (D. Mass. 1970): "The university setting
of college-age students being exposed to a wide range of intellectual experiences creates a
relatively mature market-place for the interchange of ideas so that the free speech clause
S..
with its underlying assumption that there is positive social value in an open forum
seems particularly appropriate."; Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924
(Sup. Ct. 1962): "I would have thought ... that one of the aims of a college worthy of
the name was to stimulate thought and to provoke intellectual controversy. The action of
the Dean . . . and the President ... in this case bespeaks a contrary belief-they seem
to regard intellectual quiescence and freedom from any conceivable identification with
strongly expressed views as being necessary to their educational goals." 230 N.Y.S.2d at
934. "To be sure, the ... College authorities are motivated by the desire to preserve the
good name of their college, rather than by a desire to stifle minority opinion. But even if
I were to suppose that they were correct in believing that to allow dissenting opinion to
be expressed from their platforms has a tendency to besmirch the institution-and I, in
fact, think they are wrong in this-this would not provide a sufficient reason to deny the
expression of the opinion.
'Only an emergency can justify repression.'" Id. (citation
omitted).

"'See Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 656 (D.C.
Cir. 1971): "[Als the Supreme Court has said in the context of classroom debate 'supervised and ordained discussion' is not enough. . . . In other words, there is always a strong
First Amendment interest in opening up channels for more spontaneous, self-initiated,
self-controlled expression." (footnote omitted).
14'Assuming public disavowal by university officials, this would certainly have been
clear to nearly everyone in the stands.
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''may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that
are officially approved,"' 4 7 and, conversely, a school need not be
held to have officially approved every expression of student opinion. To invoke the relationship of a student with his school in
order to restrict extracurricular speech which is "private" in all
other respects is to misconceive and thereby dilute the meaning
of Tinker.
This is not to say, of course, that students are entitled to be
entirely free of regulation in their extracurricular activities.
Clearly they can be more strictly disciplined in matters where
"basic constitutional values" are not affected.4 8 If only student
appearance is involved, for example, courts may tend to grant
more room to administrative regulation than if the right asserted
were freedom of speech.' The measure of permissible school regulation, then, depends primarily on the nature of the right alleged
to have been infringed. Where that right can be shown to bear a
"'Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
-8Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
"'By way of illustration, grooming regulations concerning student dress and hair
length have on occasion been held of insufficient importance to warrant judicial review.
Compare Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970) (hair code for student
athletes held unconstitutional), with Neuhaus v. Torrey, 310 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal.
1970) (hair code for student athletes held constitutional). See cases cited in Murphy v.
Pocatello School Dist., 94 Idaho 32, 480 P.2d 878, 881-82 (1971); Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1201
(1967).
But even student speech may be subject to regulation in accordance with its inherent
"communicative value"-that is, whether frivolous and facetious (as in the case of a
pointlessly crude halftime show or school play) or serious and responsible. See Close v.
Lederle, 303 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Mass. 1969), rev'd, 424 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1970); Note,
Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1091 (1968) (discusses problems which result when
symbolic conduct is less clearly communicative).
The armband protest considered in Tinker was held to involve responsible first
amendment activity:
These petitioners merely went about their ordained rounds in school. Their
deviation consisted only in wearing on their sleeve a band of black cloth, not
more than two inches wide. They wore it to exhibit their disapproval of the
Vietnam hostilities and their advocacy of a truce, to make their views known,
and, by their example, to influence others to adopt them.
393 U.S. at 514. The Williams athletes, therefore, should have been well within their rights
in wearing armbands for an equally responsible purpose.
They might not have been entitled, however, to wear a black jersey (interference with
the game), shout obscenities at Mormon fans ("fighting words"; little communicative
value), engage in unruly conduct, and so forth. And it could be argued that even the
wearing of an armband might justify regulatory action by the coach if the athletes were
participating in a different kind of athletic event, such as a swim meet, where its presence
would substantially impair their performance. In determining which athletes would compete, a coach might then be entitled to reassess their potential contribution to the team's
showing in light of this predictable impairment of their individual performances.
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high order of importance, the authority of the school to regulate
its exercise will be more carefully limited.
By participating in extracurricular activities, then, a student
may arguably limit his latitude in expressing his personality, but
not in the sincere, nondisruptive expression of his individual
beliefs. Basic first amendment rights are consistently worthy of
protection, whether implicated in extracurricular or classroom
activities. Consequently, they can only be regulated under a single standard addressed to the value of the right itself and the
means of its expression (i.e., the Tinker rule). And in applying
this standard, the relationship of the student with his school is
constitutionally irrelevant, so long as his expression is privately
initiated.
A related quotation from Bond v. Floyd, where members of
the Georgia House of Representatives challenged Julian Bond's
right to be seated because of his antiwar statements, is especially
applicable to this point:
"I stand before you today charged with entering into public discussion on matters of National interest. I hesitate to offer explanations
for my actions or deeds where no charge has been levied against me
other than the charge that I have chosen to speak my mind ....
The posture of my life for the past five years has been calculated to
give Negroes the ability to participate in formulation of public policies. The fact of my election to public office does not lessen my duty
or desire to express my opinions even when they differ from those

held by others.
flnd
.

...........

.

.

."150

position, the Supreme Court observed:

The State attempts to circumvent the protection the First
Amendment would afford to these statements if made by a private
citizen by'arguing that a State is constitutionally justified in exacting a higher standard . . . from its [representatives]than from its
citizens."'

State officials, therefore, have no authority to exact a more restrictive standard for speech on the basis of some alleged "representative" relationship with the state. And so when dealing with
the Tinker standard for campus expression, school authorities are
legally bound to apply it uniformly to all students, without distinctions based on the particular activity in which they are engaged. To restrict otherwise protected private expression by artificially categorizing certain students as "representatives" of the
'1-385 U.S. 116, 124-25 (1966).
"'Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
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state is, as in Bond,
tantamount to circumvention of first amend2
ment guarantees.
IIl.

STATE NEUTRALITY TOWARD RELIGIOUS PROTEST

We have seen that the private expression of peaceful dissent
is permissible, even though it may be directed at a religious group
or belief. Where the state may be unduly involved in that expression, however, the question is more difficult, for "when government activities touch on the religious sphere, they must be secular in purpose, evenhanded in operation, and neutral in primary
impact."'' 3
A. Neutrality
Williams placed a great deal of emphasis on the need for
religious neutrality by the state, quoting School Districtof A bington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp to this effect: "The government is neutral, and, while protecting all [religious opinions
and sects], it prefers none, and it disparagesnone." '54

Admittedly, separation of church and state demands that
government remain neutral in all its dealings with religion. Under
the "secular purpose" doctrine,' however, many instances of
5

'Consider, for example, the fact that other black students at Wyoming were allowed
to wear armbands as an expression of their private opinions on Mormon racial policy. Brief
for Defendants-Appellees at 7-8, Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1972). And
remember that Williams cited no other case which stands for the proposition that some
students can be classified as school "representatives" so as to restrict their first amendment rights.
"'Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971).
" 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963) (emphasis in the original), quoting Minor v. Board of
Educ., (Cincinnati Super. Ct., Feb. 1870) (unpublished opinion of Judge Alphonso Taft).
Note that in relying on Schempp the Williams court placed itself in the ironic position of
restricting the rights of nonbelievers by citing a case which upheld the rights of other
nonbelievers.
In evaluating phrases like "it disparagesnone" and "rights of others," the researcher
would be well-advised to recall the warning expressed in Anderson v. Laird:
"The hazards of placing too much weight on a few words or phrases of the
Court is abundantly illustrated within the pages of the Court's opinion in
Everson [v. Board of Education]." The Chief Justice noted that the Court
had stated in Everson that the government cannot "pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another" but had no
difficulty in upholding a taxing statute which undoubtedly helped children
get to church schools.
466 F.2d 283, 289 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076
(1972), quoting Walz v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970).
"5 The "secular purpose" doctrine constitutes an exception to the traditional principle
of separation of church and state. Periodic elaborations have determined that a "secular
purpose," with "a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion"
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government activity apparently supportive of religion have been
held not to offend the constitutional requirement of neutrality. 5
The reasoning in these cases has generally been that the government involvement consisted only of neutral, nonpreferential provision of government services, facilities, or materials to all on an
equal basis.'57 And if government action only indirectly inures to
the benefit of religion, the establishment clause is not violated.
So the "secular purpose" doctrine means that government
actions "directed toward secular ends are valid even though they
result in incidental benefits for religious purposes. 158 The logical
extension of this doctrine, therefore, should protect action by the
state directed toward secular ends which results in incidental
disparagement of religion.'5 9 As applied to the Williams facts, a
state school's acceptance of its constitutional obligation to accommodate nondisruptive student expression should not be held
to violate the neutrality requirement, even though private criticism of religious policy would be an incidental side effect of meeting this obligation. 6 ° Clearly the "primary effect" of this kind of
and which avoids "an excessive government entanglement with religion," will legitimate
government action which would otherwise appear to violate the neutrality requirement.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
'5 See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (free loan of secular textbooks to
all students); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (uniform day of rest); Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (reimbursement of all parents who sent their children
to school on public buses). In Everson, by way of example, it was held that New Jersey
had not violated the establishment clause since the purpose of its h,,- f-r- rz'bubinent
program "was nnt - _'.' z'g,ub education but to promote the valid public welfare
purpose of providing safe transportation for children attending parochial schools." Kauper, The Warren Court: Religious Liberty and Church-State Relations, 67 MICH. L. REv.
269, 270 (1968).
"'57Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1971): "Our decisions from Everson to
Allen have permitted the State to provide church-related schools with secular, neutral,
or nonideological services, facilities, or materials. Bus transportation, school lunches,
public health services, and secular textbooks supplied in common to all students were not
thought to offend the Establishment Clause."
'5 'Kauper, supra note 156, at 280, citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
See Sutherland, Historians, Lawyers, and "Establishment of Religion," in RELIGION AND
THE PUBLIC ORDER 27, 49-50 (D. Giannella ed. 1969): "I suggest that in no case has the
Supreme Court decided that a nonpreferential governmental activity, with a secular
objective, and with no element of religious compulsion on the individual, is nevertheless
unconstitutional because some incidental advantage may accrue to some religious group."
"'Compare the "incidental burden" on religion held justified by a substantial governmental interest in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). Note also the similarity
with the "free exercise" cases where substantial governmental interests have been held
to outweigh freedom of religion. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
""See Cohen v. California, where the neutral role of government in regulating speech
was described as follows:
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school policy would be to further a "secular purpose" 6 -the
evenhanded provision of access to school property for use as a first
2
amendment forum.6
Thus the mere "involvement" of religion in government activity does not, of itself, presuppose a violation of the establish6 3
ment clause:
[TIhe usual rule [is] that governmental bodies may not prescribe the form
or content of individual expression . . . . The constitutional right of free
expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours.
It is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena
of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced
largely into the hands of each of us, . . . in the belief that no other approach
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which
our political system rests.
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear
to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are,
however, within established limits, in truth necessary side effects of the
broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits us to
achieve. That the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in
this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength. We cannot lose sight of the
fact that, in what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying instance of
individual distasteful abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal values
are truly implicated. That is why . . . "so long as the means are peaceful,
the communication need not meet standards of acceptability [to others]."
403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971) (emphasis added) (citation omitted), quoting Organization for
a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
"'See Walz v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 692 (Brennan, J., concurring): The "principal effect" of tax exemptions for church property "is to carry out secular purposes-the
encouragement of public service activities and of a pluralistic society."
" 2 nterestingly enough, religious groups have also been extended the right to use
public school property, even for purely religious purposes such as the erection of nativity
scenes. See, e.g., Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 1256, 1268-70 (1971). In such cases it has generally
been held significant that religious symbolism is inescapable during certain holidays, that
schools are out of session during that time, and that the symbols do not occasion greater
influence simply because they are located on school property. In short, the school's action
is merely a "passive accommodation of religion." Id. at 1269-70.
" 3See National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1017 (4th
Cir. 1973) (emphasis added), where a controversial political party was granted the right
to use public school property for the purpose of expressing racist and anti-semitic views:
This case is not unlike Everson v. Board of Education. . . .Just as New
Jersey in Everson did not transgress the establishment clause or unconstitutionally support parochial schools by providing transportation facilities and
"such general government services as ordinary police and fire protection,
connections for sewage disposal, public highways and sidewalks," so too,
Virginia would not transgress the equal protection clause or unconstitutionally support the Party['s racist and antisemitic views] by providing a
public forum. Although the establishment clause prohibited New Jersey
from enacting laws favoring one religion over another, . . . New Jersey was
[also] prohibited from hampering its citizens in the exercise of their own
religion by denying generally provided government services to certain
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What the Framers meant to foreclose, and what our decisions under
the Establishment Clause have forbidden, are those involvements of
religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially
religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of
government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially
religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular means
would suffice."'

In short, "what the first amendment forbids is a classification [or
state action] which results in either preference or discrimination
based on the religious factor."' 5 Furthermore, the state must
have played on active, instigatory role' in the sense that the
action must have originated with the state and must have consisted of something beyond "generally provided government servgroups. Similarly, although the fourteenth amendment in the instant case
prohibits Virginia from practicing the discrimination which the Party practices, the first amendment also prohibits Virginia from hampering its citizens in the exercise of their right to speak and assemble freely by denying a
generally provided public forum.
[Tihe use of facilities partially dedicated as a public forum for the expression of diverse views does not amount to state espousal of racist views ....
In short, the first amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with
groups of [both] religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be
[the] adversary [of either]." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
"'School Dist. of Abington Tp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-95 (1963) (Brennan,

J., concurring). Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting):
"The constitutional obligation of 'neutrality' . . . is not so narrow a channel that the
slightest deviation from an absolutely straight course leads to condemnation. There are
too many instances in which no such course can hp j-T+....
.
"Nuper, supra note 156, at 282 (emphasis added), citing P. KuRLAND, RELIGION AND
THE LAw (1962).
'See Walz v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970): "It is sufficient to note that

for the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment the 'establishment'
of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."; Panarella v. Birenbaum, 32 N.Y.2d 108, 112, 296 N.E.2d 238,
239, 343 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (1973): "Only if the colleges continued financial support to a
newspaper systematically attacking religion over a period of time, without balance, might
there be an attempt to 'establish' a 'secular religion'."; Todd v. Rochester Community

Schools, 41 Mich. App. 320, 200 N.W.2d 90, 93 (1972): "Plaintiff's complaint specifically
pleads only that SlaughterhouseFive is used in a public school and 'contains and makes
reference to religious matters.' We have been cited to no authority, nor has our own
research uncovered any, which holds that any portion of any constitution is violated
simply because a novel, utilized in a public school 'contains and makes reference to
religious matters.' . . . By couching a personal grievance in First Amendment language,
one may not stifle freedom of expression."; Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41
TEX. L. REV. 347, 367 (1963): The role of state law is so pervasive "that it is difficult to
conceive of situations where state action is not present." So a mere finding of state action
does not establish, of itself, a violation of constitutional rights. "Under the terms of the
Constitution, it must be the state which engages in the violation, not the private individual."
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ices."' 7 In Williams, however, privately initiated political belief
came into conflict with private religious belief, and in that situation government intervention on behalf of either conviction would
have been to employ the forces of the state to stifle the free
expression of the other. The only constitutionally defensible alternative for the state, then, was to assume the "politically neutral"
role of holding its public facilities open to all accepted forms of
nondisruptive expression. Surely a passive acknowledgment of its
legal obligation in this respect is hardly synonymous with "insti68
gation."'
B.

Blasphemy Analogy
Both the establishment clause and the concept of neutrality
have assumed new dimensions as courts provide further substance to the constitutional mandate that states neither aid nor
hinder religion. In State v. West,"' for example, the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals considered the constitutionality of a
state blasphemy statute, 0 and found that it constituted an abandonment by the state of its required position of neutrality on
religious matters. The petitioner there had argued that enforcement of the statute "may coerce into holding his tongue anyone
who in the course of promoting his own religious [or antireligious] belief would want to criticize Christianity.""' As in
Williams, the state countered by attempting to portray the statute "as an effort by the State to enable 'those citizens who desire
"'National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1017 (4th Cir.
1973).
"'See id.:
The essential point here is not that there is insufficient state action, but
simply that the state action doctrine is not applicable where a group seeks
to exercise first amendment rights in a public forum [partially] dedicated
to that purpose. . . . We have a . . . [forum] where the position of the state
is required to be neutral and where denial of the use of the place will substantially impair the exercise of first amendment rights.
In short, the state's "interest on this record is too remote and conjectural
to override the guarantee of the First Amendment that a person can speak
or not, as he chooses, free of all governmental compulsion." DeGregory v.
N.H. Atty. Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 830 (1966).
"'69 Md. App. 270, 263 A.2d 602 (1970).
"'Blasphemy has been defined as "maliciously reviling God or religion." Annot., 41
A.L.R.3d 519, 520 n.2 (1972). Its doctrinal foundation has been held to rest on the principle
that "it is not necessary to maintain that any man should have the right publicly to vilify
the religion of his neighbors ....
" Id. at 523. See generally T.A. SCHROEDER, CONsTrruTIONAL FREE SPEECH DEFINED AND DEFENDED

IN AN UNFINISHED ARGUMENT IN A CASE OF

BLASPHEMY (1919).

"'Annot., supra note 170, at 514 (brief of petitioner).
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to worship to carry on unmolested' . . ." ."72 In its decision, the
court adopted the Schempp interpretation of neutrality:
The wholesome "neutrality" of which this Court's cases speak thus
stems from a recognition of the teachings of history that powerful
sects or groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and
religious functions or a concert of dependency of one upon the other
to the end that official support of the State or Federal Government
would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies.,

With this potential "dependency" in mind, it then proceeded to
apply the neutrality test to the Maryland blasphemy statute:
It obviously was intended to serve. . . as a mantle of protection by
the State to believers in Christian orthodoxy and extend to those
individuals the aid, comfort and support of the State. This effort by
the State of Maryland to extend its protective cloak to the Christian
religion or to any other religion is forbidden by the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. As stated by
former Associate Justice Fortas in Epperson v. Arkansas, ". . . The
First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion."''

Under this line of reasoning, then, the University of Wyoming could be held to have done administratively (as an agency
of the State) what the State of Maryland was prevented from
doing statutorily in West. In both cases the government action
could be viewed as favoring a particular religion (or religion in
general) through restricting criticism by those not likewise persuaded. Admittedly, the action taken by the respective States
arose out of a legitimate concern for the role religion plays in our
national.

e-;.

TUiz shud not, however, allow the state to adopt

an overprotective position in tacit support of the immunity of
religion from public criticism. To accept this kind of reasoning is
to lose sight of the real meaning of neutrality as applied to the
separation of church and state. And in Williams it lent support
to action by the State which amounted to deviation from its
position of neutrality in a well-intentioned, though misguided,
effort to preserve its neutrality.
C.

Accommodation of Religious Protest
The lesson to be learned from this discussion of the relationship between church and state is that a government can best be
neutral by not interfering in any way with the dissent of those
"'State v. West, 9 Md. App. 270, 263 A.2d 602, 604 (1970).
73
' Id., citing School Dist. of Abington Tp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
" 4State v. West, 9 Md. App. 270, 263 A.2d 602, 605 (1970).
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peacefully protesting religious doctrine. 7 ' The establishment
clause forbids not only "government preference of one religion
over another . . . [but also] an impartial governmental assistance of all religions."' 76 In other words, the government is also
prevented from "establishing" religion in general' by prohibiting
religious criticism. Instead the traditional state role of "passive
accommodation" of dissenting views is a more acceptable form of
neutrality here. A neutral government policy of this kind "leaves
religion on the solid foundation of its own inherent validity, without any connection with temporal authority .
"..."178
As Mr. Justice Jackson observed in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette:
[The] freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of
the existing order. 7

Once this is understood, it is clear that religious criticism is an
accepted subcategory of the freedom to dissent. To restrict constitutionally protected expression of this kind by undue expansion
of the "rights of others" exception to Tinker is to perpetuate the
outmoded view that the state can place a ban on religious criticism.",
"'This is especially true where, as in Williams, the object of the protest is a racially
discriminatory policy directly affecting those protesting.
"'Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948). See School
Dist. of Abington Tp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366

U.S. 420, 443 (1961).
'Cf. Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.

1076 (1972).
1794DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION 200 (J. Elliott ed. 1907). In this connection consider the facts in Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1951), which involved a controversial and allegedly
"sacrilegious" film ("The Miracle"). The movie was produced in Italy where "[bly the
Lateran agreements and the Italian Constitution the Italian Government is bound to bar
whatever may offend the Catholic religion." Although no action was taken to ban the film
in Italy, an unsuccessful effort to that end was made in New York City. The Commonweal,
a respected Catholic periodical, editorially "questioned the wisdom of transforming
Church dogma . . .into state-enforced censorship for all." In addition, a Commonweal
contributor noted that all the effort at censorship "will have succeeded in doing is insulting the intelligence and faith of American Catholics with the assumption that a secondrate motion picture could in any way undermine their morals or shake their faith." M.
KoNvrrz, BILL OF RIGHTs READER 576-78 (2d ed. 1960).
"'West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
"This point might be analogized to the controversy in the Sixties over university
speaker ban laws. At that time many citizens, legislators, and school officials also felt that
state colleges should not "facilitate" the expression of certain views. See Pickings v.
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CONCLUSION

As has been observed of another case involving symbolic expression, the Williams court "chose not to deal with the complexities" of the problem it faced, "made no attempt to discuss, let
alone to answer, the difficult and disturbing constitutional questions presented," but instead "trivialized the issues and handed
down an opinion that has all the deceptive simplicity and superficial force that can usually be achieved by begging the question."'' As a result, the Williams demonstrators were disciplined
because their message was unpopular, rather than because they
interfered in a material and substantial way with normal school
activities or with the rights of others. In effect, the "rights of
others" exception was used as an excuse to avoid the merits, and
such an expansive interpretation of Tinker can only serve "to
undermine the rule [enunciated] there by the 'disintegrating
8
erosion' of particular exceptions.'

2

The proper legal approach for school administrators to follow
in dealing with a situation such as that in Williams is to look to
traditional first amendment theory as a guideline. In other words,
the days of arbitrary administrative restriction of a student's constitutional rights have passed. The Tinker rule affords a student
the same right any other citizen has to make his views known. Aswith any other citizen, moreover, the exercise of this right on
school property may not be restrictciAwithout a "constitutionally
valid reason."''
Bruce, 430 F.2d 595, 598-99 (8th Cir. 1970): "Recent case law indicates that student
organizations have a broad right to sponsor controversial speakers on campus. We have
been unable to find a single case decided in the 1960's in which a speaker ban has been
upheld by a federal court."; American Civil Liberties Union v. Radford College, 315 F.
Supp. 893, 896-97 (W.D. Va. 1970) (numerous cases cited); Wright, supra note 40, at 105152; "I am strongly tempted to believe that the only good speaker ban is one that has not
yet been tested in court . . . . It will not do to limit speakers to those who 'clearly serve
the advantage of education' or to lease the auditorium only for programs 'determined to
be compatible with the aims of [the college] as an institution of higher learning.' "
"'Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-CardBurning Case, 1968
Sup. CT. Rav. 1, 3, describing the decision in United States v.O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
'"2Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928), quoting Wendt
v. Fischer, 243 N.Y. 439, 444, 154 N.E. 303, 304 (1926).
"'As observed by Professor Wright:
[lilt is a false dichotomy to suggest, as some have, that there are circumstances in which a university can limit or forbid "the exercise of a right guaranteed by the Constitution . . . to persons generally." I do not think such a
conflict ever can arise . . . . [For example, a university] rule barring loud
discussions in the reading room of the library does not limit "the exercise of
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In determining the constitutional validity of the reason offered for restricting expression on public property, whether on or
off campus, courts must look first to the particular use to which
the property has been dedicated.'84 This entails "taking into account its character, its pattern of usual activity, its essential
purpose and the people who use[d] it."' With these factors in
mind, a court is then in a better position to evaluate the extent
to which those engaged in the expression may have interfered
with the normal function of the property, and with the rights of
8
others to use that property in the intended manner. ' And if
substantial interference with the normal use is found, reasonable
regulation of the traffic control type (i.e., time, place, and manner) will be upheld, so that the degree of interference may be
minimized.
When regulation is based on the content of the expression,
however, a standard of mere reasonableness is clearly too restrictive, especially where the audience affected by the expression
consists primarily of adults. It would appear, moreover, that
those exposed to controversial or unpopular views have no legal
right to expect the state to stifle the expression of those views in
a public forum. Conversely, the state has no legal authority to
artificially construct a right of immunity from criticism on behalf
of those in a public audience. For these reasons, the expression
of symbolic "hostility" to others, where there is no showing of
violence or disruptive potential, cannot amount to interference
with the rights of others. The restriction of expression requires
"something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
a right guaranteed . . .to persons generally," for no one [on or off campus]
has a constitutional right to speak in a place so clearly inappropriate.
Wright, supra note 40, at 1042 (emphasis added). Compare the facts in Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 139 (1966), where a group of demonstrators stood peaceably in a public
library as "monuments of protest" against racial discrimination there, with those in
Williams.
" The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of
activities. Among these activities is personal inter-communication among
the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of attending
school; it is also an important part of the educational process.
Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969).
"'Nahmod, supra note 50, at 296.
"'As noted above, the nature of some public property (e.g., a public library) is such
that even a minimal amount of vocal expression might prove substantially disruptive.
This is not true, however, of school grounds during afterclass hours, especially where the
expression occurs in a school stadium and is symbolically communicated.
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unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."18 7
Nor is this altered significantly when those participating in
the protest are engaged in an extracurricular school activity. The
constitutional standard for student expression must be applied
uniformly to all students and all school activities. Distinctions
based on categorizing some students as "representatives" of the
state, so as to dilute their first amendment rights, are constitutionally indefensible under Tinker.
Likewise, the fact that the expression has religious implications is legally irrelevant, so long as it is privately initiated. The
state may not itself show hostility to religious policy, but it has a
constitutional duty to accommodate the peaceful expression of
others, even when antireligious in character. This may have an
incidental impact on religion, but so long as the state is motivated by a "secular purpose" there is no violation of the neutrality requirement.
Finally, school officials may not restrict student expression
because of some vague apprehension as to the "reflection" it may
cast on the school. This approach is totally inconsistent with the
function of the first amendment in a free society, and amounts
only to a rationalization for censorship:
The danger of our times is not that we as a people have become
aroused to fever pitch by the excitement of ideas. It is rather the
opposite, that we as a people have become inert and cnnfri.', Lrt
we dn -_-t tr.
i hear the vital issues of our day mooted from
5gn
public platforms ....
These being the dangers of our day a college should, to my
mind, pursue a policy of fostering discussion and the exchange of
opinion by providing an open forum for it to all who want to be
heard. A college should generate intellectual excitement, it should
attempt to awaken the public mind from the torpor and quiescence
of accepted and conventional opinion. 88

That is the value of freedom of expression on a college campus.
From this perspective, then, the Williams protest could hardly be
held to have constituted interference with the educational process. Rather, it was an inherent part of that process.
Richard G. Seymour
" 7Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
"'Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 476, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924, 934-35 (Sup. Ct. 1962).

